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Abstract 
 
Essays on Taxes and Donations 
 
By 
 
Ryo Ishida 
 
Chair: Miles S. Kimball 
 
 
 
This dissertation concerns donation and tax issues, significant for current policy 
making. Chapter I considers cases where fundraisers reflect donors’ preferences for the 
characteristics of public good. Relying solely on voluntary contributions, public good is 
always under-provided. Among many countermeasures of this under-provision issue, 
some fundraisers take into account large donors’ preferences. We formalize such a 
mechanism and prove that this mechanism enhances private contributions because of 
additional incentive to donate. Moreover, we find that government direct subsidy may not 
only crowds-out but also crowds-in private contributions under this mechanism. 
Crowding-in may occur because the influence of one’s contribution is leveraged by direct 
subsidy. Crowding-out may occur because direct subsidy decreases marginal utility of 
public good. We analytically deduce the condition where crowding-in/crowding-out 
occurs.  
Chapter II is a collaborated work with Hasegawa, Hoopes and Slemrod. The 
behavioral response to public disclosure of income tax returns figures prominently in 
policy debates about its advisability. Although supporters stress that disclosure 
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encourages tax compliance, policy debates proceed in the absence of empirical 
evidence about this, and any other, claimed behavioral impact. This paper provides the 
first such evidence by examining the behavioral response to the Japanese tax return 
public notification system. The analysis suggests that, when there is a threshold for 
disclosure, a non-trivial number of both individual and corporate taxpayers whose tax 
liability would otherwise be close to the threshold will under-report so as to avoid 
disclosure — a response in the opposite direction from that stressed by supporters of 
disclosure. An analysis of corporations’ financial data offers no evidence that these 
companies’ taxable income declined after the end of the disclosure system. 
Chapter III finds factors that associate with donations just after the two 
disastrous earthquakes in Japan, 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and 1995 Hanshin 
Earthquake, using household-level monthly panel data. The novel finding is that 
geographical distance from the disaster epicenter negatively associates with private 
donations, which may indicate that distance negatively correlates with sympathy. Also, 
one who donated before the earthquakes tends to donate after the earthquake. 
Moreover, income, saving and age are found to be positive factors. 
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Chapter I 
Vote with their donations: An explanation about 
crowding-in of government provision of public goods 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The remedy for the under-provision problem of public goods 
It is a painful issue to have under-provision of public goods when the externality of public 
goods is not internalized. Even though it is socially desirable to build bridges or street 
lights, for example, the private sector's provision of such public goods is less than the 
optimal because individuals have an incentive to free-ride other people's contributions 
(Bergstrom et al., 1986). 
Theoretically speaking, this problem is largely solved by a decentralized mechanism (e.g. 
Groves and Ledyard, 1977; Walker, 1981) without relying on coercive governmental 
power. However, such a mechanism is difficult to implement in the real world. In reality, 
instead of adopting such first best (but overly complicated) mechanism, a government 
implements tax deduction, tax credit, or other tax expenditure schemes for private 
contributions in order to alleviate issues of under-provision. 
Although tax expenditure is a powerful tool to enhance charitable contributions and its 
effects have been studied thus far (e.g. Clotfelter, 1985; Randolph, 1994; Auten et al., 
2002; Bakija and Heim, 2011), the greatest caveat of tax expenditure is that only 
government can implement such a mechanism. Even government may face difficulty 
implementing (or modifying) the tax expenditure mechanism because of political 
resistance. 
Therefore, private fundraisers and sometimes even government implement other kinds 
of instruments which do not rely on the tax mechanism that requires government's 
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coercive power. A “thank you” letter is a typical (and less costly) example that private 
institutions can provide. Earmarked donations are frequently used to enhance private 
contributions (e.g. Li et al. 2011) and how much people increase their contribution when 
earmarking is available has been vigorously studied (e.g. Batista et al., forthcoming; De 
Arcangelis et al, 2015; Eckel et al., 2014). Not only private institutions (e.g. 
DonorsChoose.org) but also governments accept earmarked donations; around 80% of 
local governments in Japan accept earmarked donations under the hometown tax 
payment system (Konishi, 2015) and the US government has accepted earmarked 
donations (the federal government of the USA has accepted earmarked donations for 
reducing the national debt since 1961. (Slemrod, 2003)). Some organizations publish the 
top donor’s name (e.g. Bureau of Investigative Journalism). These measures are 
examples where fundraisers reflect the large donors' preference and modify the 
characteristics of the public goods. Another good example is engraving the top donor’s 
name on a school building as well as applying it to a business school program (e.g. Ross 
School of Business in the University of Michigan). Further examples are introduced in a 
later section. 
Considering these examples, one may recall a model where a certain good is a mixture 
of a pure public good and a private good. Such kind of good is called an impure public 
good and has already been studied (Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni, 1990; Cornes and 
Sandler, 1994). “Thank you” letters can be understood using the impure public good 
model. However, if fundraisers modify the characteristics of a public good in response to 
large donors' preferences, such public good cannot be analyzed under the impure public 
good model because one's donation may have both positive and negative externality. 
Tiebout (1956) suggested in his classic paper that people "vote with their feet." People 
reveal their preference by choosing where to live. A similar phenomenon can be 
considered on private provision on public goods. People reveal their preferences, 
incompletely but to some extent, by choosing where to donate or how to donate. 
Earmarked donations to local municipalities or universities also reveal donors’ 
preferences. Therefore, it is natural to imagine that fundraisers, such as government, 
local government, universities and so on, reflect the revealed preferences of the donors. 
This reflection may take a variety of forms, e.g. engraving the donor’s name, building a 
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bridge closer to the donor’s residence, or facilitating academic research that the donor 
prefers. The key aspect is that one’s donation to a public good makes the whole public 
good more favorable to the donor, but may make the whole public good possibly less 
favorable to others1.  
A similar problem is analyzed by Morgan (2000) that analyzes the effect of a fixed prize 
raffle. His model exploits the structure of a lottery that the lottery revenue minus the 
amount of prize is used for providing public goods and that the winning probability is 
proportional to one’s donation. In his model, one's donation has a positive externality 
because it increases the amount of public goods, but has a negative externality because 
it reduces other people's probability of winning the prize. He theoretically proves that the 
issue of under-provision is alleviated under this lottery mechanism. Our model is different 
from but shares ideas with Morgan (2000). For example, different from Morgan (2000), 
our mechanism has an application limit; too much negative externality may worsen the 
social welfare. Therefore, in this paper, we first generalize Morgan's (2000) model and 
show that our model is a special case of this generalized Morgan’s (2000) model. Then, 
we show that the under-provision issue is alleviated under our model as is in Morgan's 
(2000) model and provide the effective range of our mechanism. 
 
1.2 Explanation of crowding-in in our model 
In this paper, we show that government direct subsidy to public goods may not only 
crowd-out private contributions but also sometimes crowd-in private contributions. This is 
something different from the model by Morgan (2000), where only the crowding-out 
effect is shown. The novel finding in this paper is that we provide a new model that 
explains both crowding-in and crowding-out in the same framework. 
A simple model of pure public good provides a dismal prediction that a government direct 
subsidy for public goods completely crowds out private provision on public goods (Warr, 
1982; Roberts, 1984; Bergstrom et al., 1986). If this prediction were true, government 
direct subsidy would generally not make sense from the viewpoint of fundraising. 
However, in reality, the situation is not so depressing; the crowding-out effect is generally 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, public good is non-rival and non-excludable ex-post (after collecting individuals’ donations). 
However, “public good” in this paper can be rival ex-ante, because one’s donation may make the “public 
good” less favorable to others. 
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incomplete (Andreoni, 1993; Payne, 1998; Andreoni and Payne, 2003). To explain this 
deviation, many scholars assume that each donor not only benefits from the public good 
but also acquires “warm-glow” utility from his/her act of giving (Becker, 1974; Cornes and 
Sandler, 1984; Steinberg, 1987; Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni, 1990). Some scholars 
explain this phenomenon by assuming that people have an incentive to signal their 
wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998a; Harbaugh, 1998b; Blumkin and 
Sadka, 2007). However, in a few cases, government provision may even “crowd-in” 
private provision of public goods (Rose-Ackerman, 1981; Sugden, 1982; Segal and 
Weisbrod, 1998; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Payne, 2001; 
Andreoni et al., 2014), which cannot solely be derived from the “warm-glow” explanation. 
Crowding-in may be explained by asymmetric information where a donated grant reveals 
the quality of the public goods (Romano and Yildirim 2001; Vesterlund, 2003; Potters et 
al. 2005; Andreoni, 2006). Although this explanation is predominant, there exist other 
explanations. For example, in a case where a public good comes into effect only when 
the total contribution exceeds a certain threshold, a large amount of government direct 
contribution will act as seed money; it may enhance private contribution because 
government contribution increases the probability that the public good comes into effect 
(Andreoni, 1998). 
Our model provides totally different explanations to understand the crowding-in 
phenomenon. If fundraisers reflect large donors’ preference on public goods, the 
influence of one’s donation is leveraged by the government direct subsidy. If this 
crowding-in effect dominates the crowding-out effect, which government direct subsidy 
has by nature, a government subsidy crowds-in private contributions. 
 
1.3 Construction of this paper 
Our paper is constructed as follows. In the next section, we explain Morgan’s (2000) 
fixed prize raffle model and its generalization. This generalization connotes our model in 
Section 3. In Section 3, we will see our basic model without warm-glow and then we will 
incorporate the warm-glow effect in the model. The model is also extended to multiple 
individuals and heterogeneity is considered briefly. Examples are provided in Section 4. 
In the final section, we conclude. 
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2. Morgan’s (2000) model and its generalization 
2.1 Explanation of Morgan’s (2000) model 
Our model formalized in Section 3 shares the basic idea with Morgan’s (2000) fixed prize 
raffle model. Therefore, before introducing our model, we explain the Morgan’s (2000) 
model and generalize it in this section. Note that our model in the following section is a 
special case of the generalized Morgan’s (2000) model established in this section. 
Morgan asks in his paper why lotteries are frequently used for the fundraising purpose in 
spite of the criticism of being inequitable and inefficient compared to tax instruments. He 
argues that this comparison is not fair because lotteries are often held when tax 
instruments are not feasible. He then argues that lottery is a more effective instrument for 
the fundraising purpose than just soliciting voluntary donations. 
It is well-known that, when individuals voluntarily contribute to public goods and 
government does not provide any subsidy, the public goods result in under-provision 
(Bergstrom et al., 1986). The reason is that each individual does not internalize the 
positive externality her contribution creates. Morgan (2000) finds that lottery alleviates 
this problem; if a lottery prize is prefixed, one’s contribution increases his expected prize 
and decreases others’ expected prizes. Therefore, the lottery mechanism connotes a 
negative externality mechanism which partially cancels out the positive externality one’s 
contribution creates. The similarity between Morgan (2000) and our model is that one’s 
contribution to public good not only has positive externality but also have negative 
externality, and the latter (maybe partially) cancels out the former. 
In order to describe Morgan’s (2000) mechanism formally, let us assume that there are 
𝑁 people, indexed 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁. Individual 𝑖 has positive initial endowment 𝑤𝑖. Each 
individual divides its initial endowment into private consumption and purchase of lottery. 
The amount of lottery tickets that individual 𝑖 purchases is 𝑔𝑖. The prize of the lottery, 𝑃, 
is prefixed and the winning probability of the prize is proportional to the amount of lottery 
tickets she purchases. Therefore, her expected prize is 
𝑔𝑖𝑃
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
. If she wins the prize, she 
uses the prize for her private consumption. Assuming a quasi-linear utility function and 
risk neutrality, her expected utility is expressed as 
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𝑈𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 +
𝑔𝑖𝑃
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ ℎ𝑖(𝐺)   (1) 
where 𝐺 is the total amount of public goods and ℎ𝑖(𝐺) is her utility from public goods. 
Individuals experience positive but diminishing marginal utility from public goods, hence 
ℎ𝑖
′(∙) > 0 and ℎ𝑖
′′(∙) < 0 are assumed. We assume that the utility from public goods is 
non-negative, i.e. ℎ𝑖(𝐺) ≥ 0 ∀𝐺 ≥ 0. The total amount of public goods is the sum of 
individuals’ contributions net of the prize, formally 
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃.   (2) 
Combining individual utility (1) and the public good provision (2), any individual 
maximizes the following expected utility: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 +
𝑔𝑖𝑃
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ ℎ𝑖(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃).   (3) 
Note that, when the prize 𝑃 converges to zero, this model converges to a voluntary 
contribution model. Upon this limit, purchase of lottery tickets is identical to voluntary 
contribution to public goods. 
Under this setting, Morgan (2000) shows that the total amount of public goods, 𝐺 is a 
function of prize 𝑃 (see Proposition 2 in Morgan, 2000), namely 𝐺(𝑃). Let 𝐺∗ be the 
Pareto optimal amount of public goods, namely ∑ ℎ𝑗
′(𝐺∗) = 1𝑁𝑗=1  (Samuelson rule
2). 
Then, Morgan (2000) shows the following proposition that increasing prize 𝑃 (1) 
increases the total amount of public goods 𝐺(𝑃), (2) is always welfare improving, and (3) 
pushes the total amount of public goods to converge to the optimal amount. 
 
Proposition 1 
The total amount of public goods is a strictly increasing function of prize 𝑃 and it 
converges to optimal amount 𝐺∗ when prize 𝑃 increases; formally, 
𝐺′(𝑃) > 0,   (4) 
and 
lim𝑃→∞ 𝐺(𝑃) = 𝐺
∗.   (5) 
Proof: 
See Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Morgan (2000). 
                                                 
2 In Samuelson (1954), he showed that sum of marginal rate of substitutions is equal to marginal rate of 
transformation between the public good and private good if the amount of public good is optimal. 
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Morgan (2000) briefly investigates the effect of government direct subsidy on public 
goods and concludes that government direct subsidy incompletely crowds out private 
contributions. Formally, when equation (2) is substituted by 𝐺 = ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺 where 
𝑔𝐺 is government direct subsidy, −1 <
𝜕 ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝜕𝑔𝐺
< 0 is obtained (See Proposition 3 in 
Morgan, 2000)3. This point is further analyzed in the following subsection. 
 
2.2 Generalization of Morgan’s (2000) model 
Although Morgan (2000) only analyzes the lottery example in his paper, his idea is fairly 
easily generalized. There are three aspects to be extended. First, in Morgan’s (2000) 
model, the expected prize one gets is proportional to one’s contribution, but this 
weighting can be generalized; the weight is generalized to be a function of one’s 
contribution divided by total contributions. Second, in Morgan’s (2000) model, the prize is 
solely financed from private contributions, but we can consider that not only the source of 
the public goods (private contributions) but also the fruits from the public goods can be 
distributed to contributors. Consider a company collecting investment. It does not 
distribute the invested money itself to investors but it distributes the profit made from the 
investment to investors. We can consider such mechanism in fundraising; not only the 
private contributions but also the fruits from public goods can be the prize for contributors. 
Third, we incorporate government direct subsidy in the model explicitly. Even with these 
generalizations, Morgan’s (2000) basic idea is valid that negative externality created 
from the prize is a key feature to alleviate the under-provision problem. With these 
generalizations, individual expected utility is as follows: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 −
𝑔𝐺
𝑁
+ 𝜑 (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
) (𝑃 + 𝑙 (∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
− 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺))  
+ (𝑘𝑖(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) −
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
),   (6) 
                                                 
3
 Although it is not clearly stated in Morgan (2000), we can assume that this government subsidy is 
financed by lump-sum tax, because, thanks to the quasi-linear utility function, lump-sum tax only affects 
consumption one-by-one and does not affect at all the size of contribution. 
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where one’s contribution has a weakly negative externality effect (i.e. 𝜑′(∙) ≥ 0), the 
prize is always non-negative for anyone, and the total prize is not affected by who 
contributed for the public goods. (𝜑(∙) is a weighting function, i.e. ∑ 𝜑 (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
)𝑁𝑖=1 ≡ 1 
and 𝜑(∙) ≥ 0). 𝑔𝐺 can be considered as government’s direct subsidy that is financed by 
lump-sum tax. The prize consists of two parts, fixed amount 𝑃 and variable amount 
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺), where Morgan (2000) only considers the former part. It is assumed 
that the public good effect is non-negative (𝑘𝑖(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) ≥
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
∀𝑖). We 
also assume that the fixed amount of prize 𝑃 should be non-negative. The variable 
amount of prize 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) is assumed to be non-negative and its marginal 
utility is assumed to be non-negative and weakly diminishing as usual. We assume that 
the variable amount of prize 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) is not so progressively increasing; 
formally we assume that 
𝑃+𝑙(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
?̅?
 is always a weakly decreasing function of ?̅? for 
mathematical convenience. Morgan’s (2000) fixed prize raffle model is a special case of 
this generalization, where 𝜑 (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
) =
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
, 𝑘𝑖(∙) = ℎ𝑖(∙), and 𝑙(∙) = 0 hold and 
government direct subsidy is disregarded. 
The novel finding in Morgan (2000) is that, even if the prize is solely financed from 
private contributions (𝑙(∙) = 0), the increment of prize 𝑃 increases not only the total 
contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  but also the amount of public goods ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃. We can 
generalize his results as follows. Primarily, under this generalized framework, the size of 
the public goods ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺 is an increasing function of the fixed amount of prize 
𝑃 if and only if the total contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  exceeds the size of prize 𝑃 + 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −
𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺). Morgan’s (2000) result is a special case of this; in his model, total contributions 
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  always dominate the size of prize 𝑃. Moreover, we can derive the necessary 
and sufficient conditions that the increase of fixed amount of prize 𝑃 and the increase of 
government direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺 enhance total contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 . The novel finding 
here is that, in any case, either fixed amount of prize 𝑃 or government direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺 
(possibly both) must enhance total contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Therefore, we can adopt at 
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least one measure to enhance private contributions. Finally, increase of the slope of the 
weighting function 𝜑(∙) as well as the increment of the variable amount of prize 
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) always increase the total contribution ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  and thus increase the 
size of the public goods ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺. 
 
Proposition 2 
(a) If prize 𝑃 + 𝑙(∙) is zero (𝑃 = 𝑙(∙) = 0), public goods are under-provided. 
For later statements in this Proposition, we assume an interior solution, and assume 
𝑁 ≥ 3 or symmetric contributions in 𝑁 = 2. 
(b) The size of public goods ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺 is increasing in the fixed amount of prize 
𝑃 if and only if the total contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  exceeds the size of the prize 𝑃 +
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺). Morgan’s (2000) result is a special case of this statement because 
total contributions always dominate the size of the prize in his model. 
(c) The effects of the fixed amount of prize 𝑃 and government direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺 to 
private contributions are as follows: 
(c-1) Total contribution ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  is increasing in fixed amount of prize 𝑃 if and only if 
(𝑁 − 1)𝜑′ (
1
𝑁
) − (𝑁 − 1)𝜑′ (
1
𝑁
) 𝑙′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) − ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′′𝑁
𝑖=1 (∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 +
𝑔𝐺) is positive. Therefore, if the variable amount of prize 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) is 
disregarded as in Morgan (2000), fixed amount of prize 𝑃  always enhances 
private contributions4. 
(c-2) Total contribution ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  is increasing in government direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺 if and 
only if (𝑁 − 1)𝜑′ (
1
𝑁
) 𝑙′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) + ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′′𝑁
𝑖=1 (∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺)  is 
positive. Therefore, the slope of variable amount of prize 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) 
improves the effect of government direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺, the effect of which is totally 
the opposite of that in (c-1). 
(c-3) At least either fixed amount of prize 𝑃  or government direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺 
enhances private contributions. 
                                                 
4
 It is natural that a variable amount of prize 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) discourages the effect of fixed amount of 
prize 𝑃, because increase of fixed amount of prize 𝑃 decreases the size of variable amount of prize 
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺). 
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(d) Increase in 𝑙(∙) (i.e. by multiplying a fixed number that is more than one) results in an 
increase of total contribution ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 . The increase of the slope of the weighting function 
𝜑(∙) also results in an increase of total contribution ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 . 
(e) Public goods are underprovided if and only if 𝜑′ (
1
𝑁
) (𝑃 + 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺)) <
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 .
5 Statement (a) is a special case of this. 
Proof: 
See Appendix I.1 
 
As explained in Proposition 2 (b)-(c), at least either the fixed amount of prize or 
government direct subsidy enhances private contributions. Morgan (2000) finds a case 
where the former works very well (The former not only enhances private contribution but 
also increases the size of the public goods.) but the latter not. My model in the following 
section finds a case where the latter works well. 
Then, the next natural question would be whether this mechanism increases social 
welfare. It is stated in Proposition 2 (e). The left hand side is the total prize (𝑃 +
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺)) times the quantity how much fundraiser accounts donor’s 
preference, where the right hand side is the total contribution. Left hand side can be 
considered as the amount of favor for large donors. Morgan’s (2000) model is an 
extreme case because it is always welfare-improving as 𝜑′(∙) = 1, 𝑃 < ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  and 
𝑙(∙) = 0 always hold under Morgan’s (2000) mechanism. In this generalized model, our 
mechanism does not always welfare-improving. If fundraiser accounts large donor’s 
preference too much (too large 𝜑′(∙)) and/or if too much prize is made from the fruit from 
public good (too large 𝑙(∙)), this mechanism works negatively and social welfare 
decreases under this mechanism. Too much indulgence for large donors spoils social 
welfare. In this respect, Proposition 2 (e), which gives us the necessary and sufficient 
condition that the mechanism improves social welfare, exhibits the application limit of the 
mechanism. 
                                                 
5
 If 𝑁 ≥ 3, the weighting function 𝜑(∙) is a linear function (Appendix I.2). Therefore, when 𝑁 ≥ 3, 𝜑′ (
1
𝑁
) 
can be substituted by 𝜑′(∙) in this statement. 
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The abovementioned model is too general to obtain a meaningful result. Therefore, in 
order to answer our problem, we will see another special case of this generalized model. 
In the following section, we will focus on a case where the prize is solely financed from 
the fruits from public goods and public goods only appear as the prize (𝑘𝑖(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑅 +
𝑔𝐺) =
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
 and 𝑃 = 0).  
 
3. Model 
3.1 Model setting 
In this section, we hereafter see that generalized Morgan’s (2000) model formalized in 
the previous section can be applied to our issue. 
For the sake of simplicity, firstly, we assume that there are two people, A and B, privately 
providing public goods. Let the contribution from A be 𝑔𝐴 where that from B be 𝑔𝐵. 
Government is also able to provide public goods directly. Let the government’s direct 
contribution be 𝑔𝐺, financed by lump-sum tax. The total amount of public goods is 
assumed to be a simple summation of these provisions, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 + 𝑔𝐺. We assume 
a quasi-linear utility function depending on one’s consumption and public goods for 
simplicity. 
Our main assumption in this model is that one’s donation on public goods makes the 
public goods preferable to the donor. This assumption is an application of Morgan’s 
(2000) idea that one’s donation has an aspect of negative externality. This idea is clearly 
imagined when a bridge, which is large enough to be non-rival, is built where two donors 
live in separated places. If one donates for the bridge, the bridge will be made closer to 
the donor and thus farther from the other. This characteristics can be described by a 
symmetrical function 𝑓(∙) . Imagine that 𝑓(𝑔𝐴/(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵))  is the accessibility of the 
bridge from A and 𝑓(𝑔𝐵/(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵)) is that from B. Accessibility is negatively correlated 
with the distance from the residence to the bridge. In such a case, it is natural to assume 
that 𝑓′(∙) ≥ 0. We normalize that 1 ≥ 𝑓(∙) ≥ 0 is satisfied and assume symmetricity on 
 𝑓(∙) , i.e.  𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(1 − 𝑥) = 1∀𝑥 ∈ [0,1]. The reason why we assume symmetricity is 
that we would like to hold the total utility from public goods constant irrespective of who 
provided the public goods in order to simplify the discussion hereafter. We then assume 
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that individual utility is 
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑔−𝑖 , 𝐺) = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝑖
𝑔𝑖+𝑔−𝑖
) ℎ(𝐺)   (7) 
where 𝑐𝑖  is 𝑖 ’s consumption, 𝑔𝑖  is 𝑖 ’s contribution, 𝑔−𝑖  is the other person’s 
contribution, and ℎ(𝐺)  is the total utility derived from the public goods. Note that 
𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 does not include government contribution where 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑔−𝑖 + 𝑔𝐺 does. We 
assume that total utility derived from the public goods is weakly positive and strictly 
increasing with respect to the size of the public goods, and its marginal utility is 
diminishing; formally ℎ(∙) ≥ 0, ℎ′(∙) > 0 and ℎ′′(∙) < 0, as usual. The individual budget 
constraint is 
𝑤𝑖 −
𝑔𝐺
2
= 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖   (8) 
where 𝑤𝑖 is 𝑖’s initial endowment. In order to ensure an inner solution, we assume a 
sufficient initial endowment so that private consumption always takes a strictly positive 
value. 
Note that total utility derived from public goods in Bentham’s sense is ℎ(𝐺), independent 
from who provided the public goods. It is also worth noting that this model converges to 
the standard model if we assume 𝑓(∙) to be constant, i.e. 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/2∀𝑥. 
It is easy to see that our problem is another special case of the generalized Morgan’s 
(2000) model. If we substitute 𝑘𝑖(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑅 + 𝑔𝐺) =
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
, 𝑃 = 0, 𝑙(∙) = ℎ(∙), 
𝜑(∙) = 𝑓(∙) and 𝑁 = 2 in the generalized Morgan’s (2000) model and we can obtain our 
model. 
The well-known fact is that, under the standard model, private donations alone result in 
under-provision of public goods and government provision completely crowds out private 
donations (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Bergstrom et al., 1986). 
 
Proposition 3 
If the model in equation (7)-(8) converges to the standard model: 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/2∀𝑥, 
(a) Private provision 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 alone results in under-provision of public goods. 
(b) Government provision 𝑔𝐺  completely crowds out private provision 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵  if 
𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 > 0. Formally, 
d(𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵)
𝑑𝑔𝐺
= −1 if 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 > 0. 
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Proof: 
See Appendix I.3 
 
However, if one’s donation makes the public goods more preferable to the donor, the 
story is not that simple. Under the quasi-linear utility function, the initial endowment only 
affects private consumption and does not affect private provision. Therefore, there is a 
reasonable ground to assume symmetric contributions. Then, as stated in the following 
proposition, private provision will be enhanced and government provision may result in 
partial crowding-out or even crowding-in. 
 
Proposition 4 
Suppose that an inner solution is guaranteed and consider symmetric contributions: 
𝑔 ≡ 𝑔𝐴 = 𝑔𝐵. Then, 
(a) Private provision 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 is always weakly larger than that under the standard 
model: 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/2∀𝑥. The inequality is strict if and only if 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) > 0. 
(b) Government provision 𝑔𝐺  incompletely crowds out private contribution if 0 <
𝑓′ (
1
2
) < −
2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
ℎ′(𝐺)
 and 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 > 0  hold. Government provision even enhances 
private contribution if 𝑓′ (
1
2
) > −
2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
ℎ′(𝐺)
 holds. 
Proof: See Appendix I.4 
 
The intuition of these results is rather simple. With respect to (a), the intuition is as 
follows: if 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) > 0 holds, there is an additional incentive for A to donate because 
her donation makes the public goods more preferable for herself (e.g. the bridge will be 
built closer to her house.). 
With respect to (b), we should note that there are two ambivalent incentives for 
individuals. An individual has an incentive to free-ride as we saw in Proposition 1. 
However, if 𝑓′ (
1
2
) is large enough, an individual has an additional incentive to donate so 
as to make the public goods more preferable for him/herself. 
Then, let us consider a case where government provides a unit amount to the public 
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goods. It decreases an individual’s incentive to donate because it decreases the 
marginal utility in the public goods (-
1
2
ℎ′′(𝐺)). However, it increases an individual’s 
incentive to donate because the effect of one’s donation is leveraged by the government 
provision (
𝑓′(
1
2
)ℎ′(𝐺)
4𝑔
). Government provision may result in partial crowding-in or 
crowding-out due to the comparison of the two ambivalent elements. 
 
3.2 Optimality condition 
Perhaps the optimality condition is of interest. The Samuelson rule states that the 
optimal amount of public goods is given by ℎ′(𝐺) = 1. Under a symmetric assumption, 
the first order condition is given as 𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ(𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ′(𝐺) = 4𝑔. Therefore, at the optimal, 
𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ(𝐺) = 2𝑔 with ℎ′(𝐺) = 1 and 𝐺 ≥ 2𝑔 should be satisfied. Without government 
subsidy, this condition converges to 𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ(𝐺) = 𝐺 with ℎ′(𝐺) = 1 and therefore the 
optimal slope of 𝑓 is given by 𝑓′ (
1
2
) =
ℎ′−1(1)
ℎ(ℎ′−1(1))
. With government subsidy 𝑔𝐺 , the 
optimal slope of 𝑓 is given by 𝑓′ (
1
2
) =
ℎ′−1(1)−𝑔𝐺
ℎ(ℎ′−1(1))
. As we saw in the generalized model, 
too much slope in 𝑓 (i.e. 𝑓′ (
1
2
) >
ℎ′−1(1)−𝑔𝐺
ℎ(ℎ′−1(1))
 ) works negatively and actually decreases 
social welfare. 
 
3.3 Sufficient condition for symmetric solution 
The abovementioned propositions hold for symmetric contribution. The necessary and 
sufficient condition that a symmetric contribution is in Nash equilibrium is described in 
the following proposition. 
In addition, although our consideration is only restricted in symmetric contribution, there 
may exist asymmetric equilibrium. Therefore, it would be useful to show the application 
limit of the abovementioned results. We provide a sufficient condition that there exists no 
asymmetric Nash equilibrium in the following proposition. Under this condition, we may 
restrict our consideration in symmetric contribution. 
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Proposition 5 
(a) Symmetric contribution 𝑔 ≡ 𝑔𝐴 = 𝑔𝐵  is in Nash equilibrium if and only if 
2𝑓 (
𝑔′
𝑔+𝑔′
) ℎ(𝑔 + 𝑔′ + 𝑔𝐺) + 2(𝑔 − 𝑔
′) ≤ ℎ(2𝑔 + 𝑔𝐺)∀𝑔′ ≥ 0 is satisfied. 
(b) There exists no asymmetric Nash equilibrium if the following system has no roots in 
(𝑥, 𝛼) ∈ [0, ∞) × (
1
2
, 1] 
   {
𝑓′(𝛼) =
(2−ℎ′(𝑥+𝑔𝐺))𝑥
ℎ(𝑥+𝑔𝐺)
, (9)
𝑓(𝛼)−1/2
𝛼−1/2
=
2
ℎ′(𝑥+𝑔𝐺)
− 1. (10)
 
Proof: See Appendix I.5 
 
An example that the condition in Proposition 5 is satisfied is as follows. 
 
Example 1. 
Suppose 𝑓(𝛼) = 2 (𝛼 −
1
2
)
3
+
1
2
(𝛼 −
1
2
) +
1
2
 and ℎ(𝐺) = √𝐺 . Then, (𝑔𝐴, 𝑔𝐵) = (
1
8
,
1
8
)  is 
the only Nash equilibrium where government contribution 𝑔𝐺 = 0. 
Proof: See Appendix I.6 
 
This example is the case where government contribution neither crowds out nor crowds 
in private contribution. If you would like to see a case where symmetric equilibrium is the 
only Nash equilibrium and government contribution crowds in private contribution, 
slightly modify the abovementioned example to ℎ(𝐺) = 𝐺𝛾 where γ = 0.51 and you can 
see that (𝑔𝐴, 𝑔𝐵) = (
1
2
(
1
4
+
𝛾
2
)
1
1−𝛾
,
1
2
(
1
4
+
𝛾
2
)
1
1−𝛾
)  is the only Nash equilibrium where 
government contribution crowds in private contribution. If you choose γ = 0.49, it will be 
the only Nash equilibrium where government contribution partially crowds out private 
contribution. 
 
3.4 Model with warm-glow 
The abovementioned model does not incorporate warm-glow effect. However, as 
Diamond (2006) investigated, warm-glow effect is not disregarded in private donation 
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literature. Then, the natural question would be how our results would change if we would 
incorporate it into our model. If we incorporate warm-glow effect, which was formalized 
by Andreoni (1990), government provision only partially crowds out private provisions in 
the standard model (i.e. 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/2∀𝑥). However, the striking result is that Proposition 2 
is still valid even if we incorporate warm-glow effect in the utility function. This statement 
is formally explained in the following proposition. 
To be precise, let us assume that the individual utility function is: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑔−𝑖 , 𝐺) = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑘(𝑔𝑖) + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝑖
𝑔𝑖+𝑔−𝑖
) ℎ(𝐺),   (11) 
where 𝑘(𝑔𝑖)  reflects a warm-glow effect with the standard assumption 𝑘(∙) > 0 , 
𝑘′(∙) > 0 and 𝑘′′(∙) < 0. Note that our previous model described in equation (7)-(8) is a 
special case of equation (11) with 𝑘(∙) = 0. It is known that taking into account such an 
effect improves the description of people’s behavior (Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni, 1990). 
Taking into account warm-glow effect inevitably enhances private donation (Appendix 
I.7). Moreover, we can see that Proposition 2 is still valid even if warm-glow effect is 
incorporated. 
 
Proposition 6 
Let us consider a case where warm-glow effect is incorporated into our model. Suppose 
that an inner solution is guaranteed and consider symmetric contributions: 𝑔 ≡ 𝑔𝐴 = 𝑔𝐵. 
Then, 
(a) Private provision 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 is always weakly larger than that under the standard 
model: 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/2∀𝑥. The inequality is strict if and only if 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) > 0. 
(b) Government provision 𝑔𝐺  incompletely crowds out private contribution if 0 <
𝑓′ (
1
2
) < −
2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
ℎ′(𝐺)
 and 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 > 0  hold. Government provision even enhances 
private contribution if  𝑓′ (
1
2
) > −
2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
ℎ′(𝐺)
 holds. 
Proof: See Appendix I.7 
 
The reason why warm-glow does not change the main result of Proposition 4 is rather 
straightforward. It is natural that Proposition 4 (a) still holds with warm-glow effect 
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because this statement is a qualitative statement, rather than a quantitative statement. 
The reason why Proposition 4 (b) still holds with warm-glow effect is that the mechanism 
behind this statement is not affected by the warm-glow effect. Proposition 4 (b) 
compares the two effects, government provision dis-incentivizing private provision and 
government provision incentivizing private provision. The former effect comes from the 
decreasing marginal utility of public goods, which is irrelevant to warm-glow effect. The 
latter comes from the leverage effect of government provision, which is also irrelevant to 
warm-glow effect. Therefore, warm-glow effect does not affect the condition whether 
government provision crowds out private provision or crowds it in. 
 
3.5 Multiple individuals 
The abovementioned model with two individuals is extended to multiple individuals fairly 
easily. Suppose there are 𝑛 individuals indexed by 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑛. Let contribution from 
individual 𝑖  be 𝑔𝑖 , consumption of individual 𝑖  be 𝑐𝑖 , and government’s direct 
contribution be 𝑔𝐺 financed by lump-sum tax (each person pays 
𝑔𝐺
𝑁
 as tax). Let 𝑔−𝑖 be 
total contributions from individuals other than individual 𝑖, i.e. 𝑔−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 . The total 
amount of public goods is assumed to be a simple summation of all contributions, 
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑔𝐺. Individual utility is assumed to be 
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑔−𝑖 , 𝐺) = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝑖
𝑔𝑖+𝑔−𝑖
) ℎ(𝐺)   (12) 
where ℎ(𝐺), the total utility derived from the public goods, satisfies increasing and 
diminishing marginal utility, i.e. ℎ′(∙) > 0 and ℎ′′(∙) < 0 , and the non-negative and 
weakly increasing function 𝑓: [0,1] → [0,1]  as a weighting function ( 𝑓 (
𝑔1
∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) +
𝑓 (
𝑔2
∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + ⋯ + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝑛
∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) = 1holds, i.e. formally ∀(𝛼1, 𝛼2, ⋯ , 𝛼𝑛) ∈ [0,1]
𝑛; ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ⇒
∑ 𝑓(𝛼𝑖) = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ). If 𝑛 = 2, this model converges to the model in equation (7)-(8). In this 
extension, it should be noted that weighting function 𝑓 is restricted to a linear function, 
specifically 𝑓(𝛼) = 𝛽 (𝛼 −
1
𝑛
) +
1
𝑛
 with 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] , if 𝑛 ≥ 3  holds (See lemma and 
Appendix I.8). Also, it should be noted that this is also a special case of a generalized 
Morgan’s (2000) model with 𝑘𝑖(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑅 + 𝑔𝐺) =
𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
, 𝑃 = 0, 𝑙(∙) = ℎ(∙), 
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and 𝜑(∙) = 𝑓(∙). Similar to the simple model with two individuals, if we focus on the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 are extended in the 
following way. 
 
Proposition 7 
(a) If weighting function 𝑓 converges to a constant function i.e. 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/𝑛∀𝑥, private 
provision ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  alone results in under-provision of public goods and government 
provision 𝑔𝐺 completely crowds out private provision ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  if ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 > 0 holds. 
Formally, 
d(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )
𝑑𝑔𝐺
= −1 is satisfied if ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 > 0 holds. 
(b) Focusing on symmetric contribution, private provision ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  is always weakly 
larger than that under the abovementioned case (a): 𝑓(𝑥) = 1/𝑛∀𝑥. The inequality is 
strict if and only if 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
) > 0 holds. 
(c) Focusing on symmetric contribution, government provision 𝑔𝐺 incompletely crowds 
out private contribution if 0 < 𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) < −
𝑛𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
(𝑛−1)ℎ′(𝐺)
 and ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 > 0 hold. Government 
provision even enhances private contribution if  𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) > −
𝑛𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
(𝑛−1)ℎ′(𝐺)
 holds. 
Proof: See Appendix I.9 
 
In order to clarify what is stated in the abovementioned proposition, we herein provide an 
example of multiple individuals. With this example, it is observed that crowding-in is not a 
rare case. Rather, under this example, when the number of people 𝑛 gets larger, it may 
become more probable that government contribution crowds-in private contribution. 
 
Example 2. 
Suppose there are 𝑛  identical individuals. Suppose 𝑓(𝛼) = 𝛽 (𝛼 −
1
𝑛
) +
1
𝑛
 with 
0 < 𝛽 <
1
2
 and ℎ(𝐺) = √𝐺. 
Without government contribution, the symmetric contribution equilibrium is 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔 =
(2𝛽(𝑛−1)+1)2
4𝑛3
∀𝑖. Therefore, ℎ′(𝐺) =
𝑛
2𝛽(𝑛−1)+1
> 1 holds, implying that public goods are 
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under-provided in this case. Small government contribution partially crowds out private 
contribution if 𝛽 <
1
2(𝑛−1)
 and crowds in if 𝛽 >
1
2(𝑛−1)
. 
Proof: Simple calculation results in 𝑔 =
(2𝛽(𝑛−1)+1)2
4𝑛3
, ℎ′(𝐺) =
𝑛
2𝛽(𝑛−1)+1
 and ℎ′′(𝐺) =
−
2𝑛3
(2𝛽(𝑛−1)+1)3
. Proposition 7 (c) results in the conclusion. 
 
3.6 Heterogeneity 
It is natural to ask how heterogeneity can be incorporated into our model. Many scholars 
considered heterogeneity in wage rate (e.g. Mirrlees, 1971; Blumkin and Sadka, 2007) or 
in initial endowment (e.g. Bergstrom et al., 1986). However, due to the characteristics of 
the additively separable quasi-linear utility function, such heterogeneity does not affect 
anyone’s choice of private contribution, unless one or more people’s consumption takes 
the lower bound zero. Instead of considering the heterogeneity in initial endowment, we 
may slightly modify our model and consider heterogeneity. The example is shown as 
follows. 
Let us assume that there are two groups of people, group A and group B. The former 
consists of 𝑁𝐴 people and the latter 𝑁𝐵. Consider a case where people in group A live in 
Town A and people in group B live in Town B. They are arguing where to build a bridge. 
The bridge will be built closer to Town A if total private provision from group A exceeds 
that from group B and vice versa. In such a case, heterogeneity is taken into account 
with regard to the number of people in each group. Note that, in such a case, private 
contribution from a person in group A has both positive and negative externality for 
people in group B, but it has only positive externality for other people in group A. 
Formally, let the total private provision from group A be 𝐺𝐴 where that from group B is 
𝐺𝐵. We then assume that individual 𝑖’s utility is 
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝐺𝜑(𝑖), 𝐺−𝜑(𝑖), 𝐺) = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑓 (
𝐺𝜑(𝑖)
𝐺𝜑(𝑖)+𝐺−𝜑(𝑖)
) ℎ(𝐺)   (13) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is 𝑖’s consumption, 𝜑(𝑖) = A if individual 𝑖 belongs to group A and 𝜑(𝑖) = B 
otherwise. Let −𝜑(𝑖) denote A if 𝜑(𝑖) = B and −𝜑(𝑖) denote B otherwise. Assume 𝐺 
is the total amount of public goods, i.e. 𝐺 = 𝐺𝜑(𝑖) + 𝐺−𝜑(𝑖) + 𝑔𝐺  where 𝑔𝐺  is 
government’s contribution. This model converges to our basic model in section 3.1 if we 
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assume 𝑁𝐴 = 𝑁𝐵 = 1. 
Under this model, the first order condition results in the following equation: 
𝑓′ (
𝐺𝜑(𝑖)
𝐺𝜑(𝑖)+𝐺−𝜑(𝑖)
)
𝐺−𝜑(𝑖)
(𝐺𝜑(𝑖)+𝐺−𝜑(𝑖))
2 ℎ(𝐺) + 𝑓 (
𝐺𝜑(𝑖)
𝐺𝜑(𝑖)+𝐺−𝜑(𝑖)
) ℎ′(𝐺) = 1.   (14) 
This first order condition is completely parallel to the first order condition in our basic 
model in section 3.1 (i.e. see equation (4-1) of Appendix I.4) and both 𝐺𝐴 and 𝐺𝐵 do not 
depend on the number of people in each group, i.e. increase in the number of a group 
results in a decrease of private contribution per capita so that total private provision from 
the group remains constant. Therefore, this model is dealt with similar to our basic model 
in section 3.1. Note that an increase of a person’s private contribution in group A is totally 
cancelled out by the decrease of other people’s contribution in the same group. 
 
4. Examples 
There are several examples to which our model may be applied. Our model is easily 
understood by the bridge metaphor where a bridge made by private contributions 
constructed closer to large donor (and further from small donors), providing real world 
examples would be useful. Although we briefly look at such examples in the first section, 
we will look at such examples deeply. 
(1) A typical example to which our model may be applicable is an earmarked donation 
because it conveys the donor’s preference to fundraisers. As is predicted by our model, 
allowing earmarking donations significantly increases private contributions. For example, 
Li et al. (2011) report that providing the opportunity to earmark one’s donation more than 
doubles the contribution per capita and the likelihood to give to government 
organizations. Although there are pros and cons for earmarking, evidence exists that this 
opportunity enhances private contributions. 
(2) Another example is international public goods provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The IMF’s financial resources are provided by quota subscriptions from 
member countries. Quota subscription not only determines the amount member 
countries have to provide to the IMF, but also determines the voting power of member 
countries. Therefore, quota subscription has an aspect to contribute for international 
public goods, and a large contributor has negotiation power to determine the IMF’s policy. 
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This voting share is almost proportional to the quota. Although the quota is determined 
by the countries’ economic statistics such as GDP, openness, economic variability and 
international reserves, it can be modified by negotiation and consent of an 85% majority 
of the total voting power. Now that one’s contribution increases its voting power 
compared to other countries, our model predicts that this mechanism greatly enhances 
the incentive to contribute. Anecdotal evidence to support this prediction is that many 
countries have incentive to contribute more rather than less; for example, Buira (2005, 
p.287) writes that “with the exception of Honduras in 1948, no country has ever 
requested a reduction in its quota.” 
(3) The other example is the non-price competitive auction adopted by Japanese 
Government Bond (JGB) auction. 
Let me first explain how the auction works. The auction is held twice during the day; the 
first bidding is held at noon, and this is a price competitive auction. In this first bidding, 
Primary Dealers (PDs) are obliged to bid for an adequate amount and purchase at least 
a specified share of the planned total issuance amount. The result of this auction is 
published at 12:45. 
Then, the second bidding is closed at 14:30, and it is a non-price competitive auction. 
The PDs are eligible to participate in this second bidding, and they are able to purchase 
JGBs at their average successful bidding price at the first bidding. 
Now, each PD can make profit without any risk if the market value of JGBs at 14:30 is 
greater than the average successful bidding price at the first bidding. The total amount of 
issuance in a non-price competitive auction (2nd bidding) is predefined and the 
maximum amount that each PD can buy is proportional to the successful bid in the JGB 
price competitive auction (1st bidding). 
This auction system, which is a combination of a price-competitive and a non-price 
competitive auction, has the following features. 
--- the more one purchases JGBs in the first bidding, the more one can purchase JGBs in 
the second bidding. 
--- the more one purchases JGBs in the first bidding, the less other PDs can purchase 
JGBs in the second bidding. 
Based on these features, the government can enhance the incentive for PDs to purchase 
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more JGBs at the first bidding. My model can explain this. 
(4) Finally, our model is applicable to explain the phenomenon reported by Brooks (2000) 
that a low level of public subsidy for concerts crowds-in private donations where a high 
level of it crowds-out private donations. Brooks (2000) does not provide any theoretical 
model to explain this phenomenon. Consider a case where the utility function of public 
goods ℎ(𝐺) is quadratic, say 𝛼𝐺 − 𝛽𝐺2  where 𝐺 ∈ [0,
𝛼
2𝛽
]. Let there be 𝑛 identical 
people contributing for concerts and let 𝑔(𝑔𝐺) be donation per capita where government 
direct subsidy is 𝑔𝐺. Since government budget is sufficiently large, people ignore any 
government budget problem. Assume 𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) > −
𝑛𝑔(0)ℎ′′(𝑛𝑔(0))
(𝑛−1)ℎ′(𝑛𝑔(0))
=
2𝛽𝑛𝑔(0)
(𝑛−1)(𝛼−2𝛽𝑛𝑔(0))
. In such 
a case, a low level of public subsidy crowds in private donation (See Proposition 7). 
However, when crowd-in occurs, −
𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺)ℎ
′′(𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺)+𝑔𝐺)
(𝑛−1)ℎ′(𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺)+𝑔𝐺)
=
2𝛽𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺)
(𝑛−1){𝛼−2𝛽(𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺)+𝑔(𝑔𝐺))}
 is an 
increasing function of 𝑔𝐺. Therefore, if 𝑓
′ (
1
𝑛
) is not large enough, there exists a certain 
amount of government direct contribution 𝑔𝐺̅̅̅̅  such that government contribution neither 
crowds in nor crowds out private contributions ( 𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) = −
𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ )ℎ
′′(𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ )+𝑔𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ )
(𝑛−1)ℎ′(𝑛𝑔(𝑔𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ )+𝑔𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ )
). Let 𝑆 be 
the set of these numbers. Let 𝑔𝐺̅̅̅̅
′ be the smallest number of 𝑆. Since 𝑆 is closed and 
lower-bounded, the smallest number exists in 𝑆. Then, if government subsidy is smaller 
than 𝑔𝐺̅̅̅̅
′ , government subsidy crowds in private donation, but (slightly) larger 
government subsidy crowds out private donation. 
This explanation is dependent on the assumption of the utility function of public goods 
ℎ(𝐺), but clearly interprets the coexistence of crowding-in and crowding-out. In this 
example, marginal utility for public goods is constantly decreasing. Therefore, the 
disincentive for private donation caused by government subsidy is always constant. 
However, the incentive, leverage effect, is decreasing. That is why a low level of 
government subsidy stimulates private donation where a high level discourages private 
donation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although theorists have already come up with several ideas to achieve the first-best 
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public good provision, fundraisers as well as governments tend to rely on simpler 
measures to enhance private contributions. Among the measures that do not rely on 
government’s coercive power, in order to incentivize individuals and corporate 
companies to contribute, fundraisers sometimes reflect major donors’ preferences on 
public goods as if donation has an aspect of voting. There are many examples where 
public goods become preferable to donors: engraving a large donor’s name, earmarked 
donation to local municipalities, giving special privileges to large donors when getting 
access to the public goods, etc. Although related ideas such as impure public goods, 
warm-glow, prestige etc. have been modeled so far, this idea has not been formalized. 
We provide a rigorous theoretical framework to reflect our idea, point out the similarity 
between our model and the fixed prize raffle model by Morgan (2000), and prove that 
private contribution is enhanced under our framework. 
Also, it is known that government direct subsidy, which generally causes partial 
crowding-out, sometimes results in crowding-in of private contributions. For example, 
Payne (2001) points out that government subsidy for research universities increments 
private contributions to the same universities. Our model provides a novel explanation to 
understand crowding-out and crowding-in under the same framework and finds the 
conditions where crowding-in/crowding-out occur. In our model, government direct 
subsidy incentivizes private contribution because the influence on private contribution is 
leveraged by government subsidy. As is well-known, government direct subsidy causes 
crowding-out by its nature. If the former effect dominates the latter, crowding-in occurs. 
This explanation is totally different from preexisting explanations such as asymmetric 
information or seed money, which explain the crowding-in phenomenon. 
The analysis in this paper is largely restricted to symmetric contribution. Further analysis 
should be conducted when the Nash equilibrium is asymmetric. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I.1 Proof of Proposition 2 
(a) When prize is zero, this model converges to a standard private provision problem. 
Therefore, public goods are under-provided. See Bergstrom et al (1986). 
(b) When 𝑁 ≥ 3, it is proven that the weighting function 𝜑(∙) is a linear function from the 
following lemma. 
 
Lemma 
If 𝑁 ≥ 3, the weighting function 𝜑(∙) is a linear function. 
Proof: See Appendix I.2 
 
Let the slope of weighting function 𝜑(∙) be 𝛽 ≥ 0  (When 𝑁 = 2, 𝛽 = 𝜑′ (
1
2
) ). Then, 
an individual’s first order condition is 
𝛽 (𝑃 + 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺))
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 )
2 + (𝜑 (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
) −
1
𝑁
) 𝑙′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) 
+𝑘𝑖
′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) = 1.   (1-1) 
Taking the sum of this equality, the following equation is derived: 
𝛽(𝑁 − 1)
𝑃+𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑁.   (1-2) 
The second order condition is 
𝑁 − ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛽𝑙
′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺) −
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 −𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1
2
≥ 0   (1-3) 
Taking the total difference in equation (1-1), the effect of the increase of fixed amount of 
prize 𝑃 to total contributions ?̅? = ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  is derived as follows. 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑃
=
(𝑁−1)𝛽(1−𝑙′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺))−?̅? ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁−(𝑁−1)𝛽𝑙′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)−∑ 𝑘𝑖
′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)−?̅? ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
   (1-4) 
Note that the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (1-4) is always positive due 
the second order condition (1-3). 
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The right-hand side of equation (1-4) is more than one if and only if ?̅? > 𝑃 + 𝑙(?̅? − 𝑃 +
𝑔𝐺). 
(c) The right-hand side of equation (1-4) is positive if and only if the numerator of it is 
positive. 
Also, taking the total difference in equation (1-1), the effect of the increase of government 
direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺 to total contributions ?̅? = ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  is derived as follows. 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑔𝐺
=
(𝑁−1)𝛽𝑙′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)+?̅? ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁−(𝑁−1)𝛽𝑙′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)−∑ 𝑘𝑖
′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)−?̅? ∑ 𝑘𝑖
′′(?̅?−𝑃+𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
   (1-5) 
The right-hand side of equation (1-5) is positive if and only if the numerator of it is 
positive. 
Since the numerator of the right-hand side of (1-4) plus the numerator of the right-hand 
side of (1-5) is always positive ((𝑁 − 1)𝛽), either fixed amount of prize 𝑃 or government 
direct subsidy 𝑔𝐺 enhances private contributions and it may occur that both measures 
enhance private contributions simultaneously. 
(d) The left-hand side of equation (1-2) is increasing in 𝛽 (the slope of the weighting 
function 𝜑(∙)) and in the variable amount of prize 𝑙(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺). This increase is 
to be compensated by the increase of total contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Note that both the first 
term and the second term in the left-hand side of equation (1-2) are decreasing in total 
contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 . 
(e) The Samuelson condition states that public goods are underprovided if and only if 
∑ 𝑘𝑖
′(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 − 𝑃 + 𝑔𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1 > 1. Then, our statement is easily derived. Note that public 
goods are always underprovided in the original Morgan’s (2000) model because 
𝜑′(∙) = 𝛽 = 1, 𝑙(∙) = 0, 𝑔𝐺 = 0 and ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 > 𝑃. 
 
Appendix I.2 Proof of Lemma 
If 𝑛 ≥ 3, note that; ∀𝑥, 𝑦(1 − 𝑦 ≥ 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦 ≥ 0);  2𝜑(𝑥) + 𝜑(1 − 2𝑥) = 𝜑(𝑥 + 𝑦) +
𝜑(𝑥 − 𝑦) + 𝜑(1 − 2𝑥) ⇒ 𝜑(𝑥) =
𝜑(𝑥+𝑦)+𝜑(𝑥−𝑦)
2
. Therefore, 𝜑(∙) is locally point-symmetric 
everywhere (if we assume 𝐶2 in 𝜑(∙), it is equivalent to 𝜑′′(∙) = 0 everywhere.). 
Therefore, taking into account that 𝜑(∙) is a (weakly) increasing function, 𝜑(∙) must be 
linear. 
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Appendix I.3 Proof of Proposition 3 
(a) This is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 (a). If you want to see direct proof, see 
the following. 
The optimal level of public goods satisfies the Samuelson condition: ℎ′(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) = 1. 
However, under the standard model, the first order condition satisfies 
𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
)
𝑔𝐵
(𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵)2
ℎ(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) ℎ′(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) = 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐵
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
)
𝑔𝐴
(𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵)2
ℎ(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) +
𝑓 (
𝑔𝐵
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) ℎ′(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) = 1 ⇔ ℎ′(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) = 2. Therefore, private provision alone results 
in under-provision of public goods. 
(b) The first order condition of private optimization yields ℎ′ (𝐺) = 2. Therefore, the total 
amount of public goods 𝐺 = 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 + 𝑔𝐺 is always constant. 
 
Appendix I.4 Proof of Proposition 4 
(a) The first order condition satisfies 
𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵
)
𝑔𝐵
(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵)2
ℎ(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵
) ℎ′(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) 
= 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐵
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
)
𝑔𝐴
(𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵)2
ℎ(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝐵
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) ℎ′(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) = 1.   (4-1) 
Since 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) = 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐵
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) and 𝑓 (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝐵
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) = 1, 
ℎ′(𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵) = 2 − 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
)
ℎ(𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵)
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
≤ 2.   (4-2) 
   Therefore, the private provision 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵  is always larger than that under the 
standard model and this inequality is strict if and only if 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
) > 0. 
(b) Under the assumption of an inner solution and symmetric contributions6, the first 
order condition for individual’s optimization is 
𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ(𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ′(𝐺) = 4𝑔   (4-3) 
and the second order condition7 is 
2𝑔{𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)} ≤ 𝑓′(
1
2
)ℎ(𝐺).   (4-4) 
                                                 
6 Note that 𝑓 (
1
2
) =
1
2
 always holds. 
7 Note that 𝑓′′ (
1
2
) = 0 because 𝑓(𝑥) is point symmetric around 𝑥 =
1
2
. 
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Combining the first order condition (4-3) and the second order condition (4-4), we can 
derive a simple form of the second order condition: 
−2 + ℎ′(𝐺) + 𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺) ≤ 0.   (4-5) 
Taking the total differential of the first order condition (4-3), we can derive the derivative 
𝑑(𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵)
𝑑𝑔𝐺
=
𝑑(2𝑔)
𝑑𝑔𝐺
= −
𝑓′(
1
2
)ℎ′(𝐺)+2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
−2+ℎ′(𝐺)+𝑓′(
1
2
)ℎ′(𝐺)+2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
.   (4-6) 
The second order condition (4-5) guarantees that the denominator of the right-hand side 
of derivative condition (4-6) is always negative. Therefore, the derivative condition of 
how government provision affects private provision depends on the sign of the 
numerator of the right-hand side of derivative condition (4-6). If the numerator is positive 
(𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺) > 0), government provision increases private contribution. If the 
numerator is negative (𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺) < 0), since the denominator is smaller 
than the numerator8, government provision crowds out private contribution and this 
crowding-out is incomplete if and only if 𝑓′ (
1
2
) > 0. 
 
Appendix I.5 Proof of Proposition 5 
With regard to the statement (a), the definition of Nash equilibrium 𝑓 (
𝑔′
𝑔+𝑔′
) ℎ(𝑔 + 𝑔′ +
𝑔𝐺) − 𝑔
′ ≤
1
2
ℎ(2𝑔 + 𝑔𝐺) − 𝑔∀𝑔′ ≥ 0 directly results in the conclusion. Note that the first 
order condition of statement (a) is 𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ(2g + 𝑔𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ
′(2𝑔 + 𝑔𝐺) = 4𝑔  and the 
second order condition is 2𝑔 {𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(2𝑔 + 𝑔𝐺) + 𝑔ℎ′′(2𝑔 + 𝑔𝐺)} < 𝑓
′ (
1
2
) ℎ(2𝑔 + 𝑔𝐺). 
With regard to the statement (b), let 𝛼 =
𝑔𝐴
𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵
 and 𝑥 = 𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵  where 𝑔𝐴 ≠ 𝑔𝐵 . 
Assume 𝛼 >
1
2
 without loss of generality. Then, the first order condition that (𝑔𝐴, 𝑔𝐵) is 
Nash equilibrium is 𝑓′(𝛼) =
(2−ℎ′(𝑥+𝑔𝐺))𝑥
ℎ(𝑥+𝑔𝐺)
 and 
𝑓(𝛼)−1/2
𝛼−1/2
=
2
ℎ′(𝑥+𝑔𝐺)
− 1 . There is no 
asymmetric Nash equilibrium if the system has no roots. 
 
Appendix I.6 Proof of Example 1 
                                                 
8 Note that ℎ′(𝐺) ≤ 2 from the first order condition (1-1). 
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It is easy to confirm that (𝑔𝐴, 𝑔𝐵) = (
1
8
,
1
8
) is the only symmetric Nash equilibrium. In 
order to find out that there is no asymmetric Nash equilibrium, it should be noted that the 
right-hand side of equation (3), the left-hand side of equation (3), the right-hand side of 
equation (4), and the left-hand side of equation (4) are all increasing functions where 
𝛼 >
1
2
 is satisfied. Therefore, the infimum value that 𝑥 takes in equation (3) is 𝑥 =
1
4
 
because lim
𝛼→
1
2
+0
𝑓′(𝛼) = lim
𝑥→
1
4
+0
(2−ℎ′(𝑥+𝑔𝐺))𝑥
ℎ(𝑥+𝑔𝐺)
 is satisfied. The maximum value that 𝑥 
takes in equation (4) is also 𝑥 =
1
4
 because [
𝑓(𝛼)−1/2
𝛼−1/2
]
𝛼=1
= [
2
ℎ′(𝑥+𝑔𝐺)
− 1]
𝑥=
1
4
 is satisfied. 
Thus, the system, (3) and (4), has no roots, which proves that there is no asymmetric 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
Appendix I.7 Proof of Proposition 6 
First, we will see that incorporating warm-glow effect inevitably enhances private 
donations. 
The first order condition without warm-glow effect is 
𝑓′ (
1
2
)
ℎ(2?̿?+𝑔𝐺)
4?̿?
+
ℎ′(2?̿?+𝑔𝐺)
2
= 1   (7-1) 
where it is 
𝑘′(𝑔∗) + 𝑓′ (
1
2
)
ℎ(2𝑔∗+𝑔𝐺)
4𝑔∗
+
ℎ′(2𝑔∗+𝑔𝐺)
2
= 1   (7-2) 
with warm-glow effect. Then, it is obvious to see that private contribution with warm-glow 
is more than that without warm-glow i.e. 𝑔∗ ≥ ?̿? because both 
ℎ(2𝑔+𝑔𝐺)
4𝑔
 and ℎ′(2𝑔 +
𝑔𝐺) are decreasing functions in 𝑔
 9 where the inequality 𝑘′(𝑔∗) > 0 always holds. 
 
The following proof is an extension of Appendix I.4. 
(a) The first order condition results in 
𝑘′(𝑔) + 𝑓′ (
1
2
)
ℎ(𝐺)
4𝑔
+
ℎ′(𝐺)
2
= 1.   (7-3) 
                                                 
9 
ℎ(2𝑔+𝑔𝐺)
4𝑔
 is decreasing in 𝑔. It is easily shown by taking the derivative 
𝑑(
ℎ(2𝑔+𝑔𝐺)
4𝑔
)
𝑑𝑔
=
8𝑔ℎ′(2𝑔+𝑔𝐺)−4ℎ(2𝑔+𝑔𝐺)
16𝑔2
≤ 0. Note that ℎ′(𝑥) ≤
ℎ(𝑥)
𝑥
 is always satisfied due to the 
assumption on ℎ(∙). 
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Then, private contribution converges to ?̅? under the standard model (𝑓′(𝑥) =
1
2
∀𝑥) 
where 
𝑘′(?̅?) +
ℎ′(2?̅?+𝑔𝐺)
2
= 1   (7-4) 
is satisfied. If we relax the restriction on 𝑓(∙), private contribution converges to 𝑔∗ 
where 
𝑘′(𝑔∗) + 𝑓′ (
1
2
)
ℎ(2𝑔∗+𝑔𝐺)
4𝑔∗
+
ℎ′(2𝑔∗+𝑔𝐺)
2
= 1   (7-5) 
is satisfied. Then, it is obvious to see that private contribution under this model is more 
than that under the standard model (𝑓′(𝑥) =
1
2
∀𝑥) i.e. 𝑔∗ ≥ ?̅? because both 𝑘′(∙) and 
ℎ′(∙) are decreasing functions where inequality 𝑓′ (
1
2
)
ℎ(2𝑔∗+𝑔𝐺)
4𝑔∗
≥ 0 is satisfied. The 
inequality 𝑔∗ ≥ ?̅? is strict if and only if 𝑓′ (
1
2
) > 0 holds. 
(b) Under the assumption of an inner solution and symmetric contributions, the first order 
condition for individual’s optimization is 
4𝑔𝑘′(𝑔) + 𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ(𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ′(𝐺) = 4𝑔   (7-6) 
and the second order condition is 
2𝑔{2𝑔𝑘′′(𝑔) + 𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)} ≤ 𝑓′(
1
2
)ℎ(𝐺).   (7-7) 
Combining the first order condition (7-6) and the second order condition (7-7), we can 
derive a simple form of the second order condition: 
−2 + ℎ′(𝐺) + 𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺) + 2𝑘′(𝑔) + 2𝑔𝑘′′(𝑔) ≤ 0.   (7-8) 
Taking the total differential of the first order condition (4-6), we can derive the derivative 
𝑑(𝑔𝐴+𝑔𝐵)
𝑑𝑔𝐺
=
𝑑(2𝑔)
𝑑𝑔𝐺
= −
𝑓′(
1
2
)ℎ′(𝐺)+2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
−2+ℎ′(𝐺)+𝑓′(
1
2
)ℎ′(𝐺)+2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)+2𝑘′(𝑔)+2𝑔𝑘′′(𝑔)
.   (7-9) 
The second order condition (7-8) guarantees that the denominator of the right-hand side 
of derivative condition (7-9) is always negative. Therefore, the derivative condition of 
how government provision affects private provision depends on the sign of the 
numerator of the right-hand side of derivative condition (7-9). If the numerator is positive 
(𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺) > 0), government provision increases private contribution. If the 
numerator is negative (𝑓′ (
1
2
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 2𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺) < 0), since the denominator is smaller 
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than the numerator, government provision crowds out private contribution and this 
crowding-out is incomplete if and only if 𝑓′ (
1
2
) > 0. 
 
Appendix I.8 Characteristics of function 𝑓 
Since 𝑓 is weakly increasing and 𝑛 ≥ 3, the abovementioned lemma guarantees that it 
is a linear function in [0,1]. Remembering that 𝑓 (
1
𝑛
) =
1
𝑛
, the linear function is described 
as  𝑓(𝛼) = 𝛽 (𝛼 −
1
𝑛
) +
1
𝑛
 with 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] where the upper bound of 𝛽 is derived from 
the fact: 𝑓(0) ≥ 0 and 𝑓(1) ≤ 1. 
 
Appendix I.9 Proof of Proposition 7 
(a) The first order condition for individual 𝑖 is 
𝑓′ (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )
2 ℎ(𝐺) + 𝑓 (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
) ℎ′(𝐺) = 1.   (9-1) 
Taking the sum of (9-1) for 𝑖 = 1~𝑛 and recalling that ∑ 𝑓 (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)𝑛𝑖=1 = 1, 
ℎ(𝐺) ∑ 𝑓′ (
𝑔𝑖
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)
∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
(∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )
2
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ℎ′(𝐺) = 𝑛.   (9-2) 
Since 𝑓′(𝑥) = 0∀𝑥 is satisfied, ℎ′(𝐺) = 𝑛 holds and this result implies under-provision 
as well as complete crowding-out of government contribution. 
(b) Due to the first order condition and symmetric condition, 
𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) =
𝑛𝑔(𝑛−ℎ′(𝐺))
(𝑛−1)ℎ(𝐺)
   (9-3) 
is satisfied where 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔∀𝑖. If 𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) = 0 holds, ℎ′(𝐺) = 𝑛 is derived, which implies that 
the total amount of public goods is the same as in the previous case. If 𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) > 0 holds, 
ℎ′(𝐺) < 𝑛 holds, which implies that the total amount of public goods is more than the 
previous case (a). 
(c) Due to the first order condition and symmetric condition, 
𝑑(𝑛𝑔)
𝑑𝑔𝐺
= −
(𝑛−1)𝑓′(
1
𝑛
)ℎ′(𝐺)+𝑛𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
(𝑛−1)𝑓′(
1
𝑛
)ℎ′(𝐺)−𝑛+ℎ′(𝐺)+𝑛𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺)
   (9-4) 
holds. Equality (9-3) and 𝑓′(∙) ≥ 0 imply the inequality ℎ′(𝐺) ≤ 𝑛, which means that the 
numerator of the right-hand side of equation (9-4) is weakly larger than the denominator. 
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Due to the second order condition −2(𝑛 − ℎ′(𝐺)) + 2(𝑛 − 1)𝑓′ (
1
𝑛
) ℎ′(𝐺) + 𝑛𝑔ℎ′′(𝐺) < 0, 
the denominator is always negative. Therefore, if the numerator is negative, there is 
partial crowding-out if 𝑓′ > 0. If the numerator is positive, government contribution 
results in crowding-in. 
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Chapter II 
The effect of public disclosure on reported taxable 
income: Evidence from individuals and corporations 
in Japan 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Public disclosure of private income tax return information is an intriguing tax policy 
instrument. Supporters argue that it improves tax compliance and informs public policy 
discussion, while detractors deride it as an invasion of privacy that could have negative 
compliance effects. Public disclosure has a long history in the United States and 
elsewhere. The U.S. income tax contained disclosure provisions for both corporations 
and individuals during the Civil War, and again in the 1920’s and 1930’s; disclosure of 
corporate tax information received a flurry of attention in 2003, including proposed 
legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress. Recently, President Barack Obama’s 2012 
Framework for Business Tax Reform calls for elements of corporate income tax 
disclosure. Similarly, Australia is currently considering implementing a system of income 
tax disclosure. Norway, Sweden, and Finland all currently require some type of public 
disclosure of taxable information. In Japan, the focus of this study, public disclosure of 
both individual and corporation income tax information was required from 1950 until 
2004.  
The academic literature has extensively examined tax disclosure and privacy (e.g., 
Lenter, Shackelford and Slemrod, 2003), asserting links between disclosure and 
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compliance.10 However, these analyses, and the policy debate surrounding them, have 
proceeded in the complete absence of empirical evidence about the effects of income 
tax disclosure, so that any arguments supporting or opposing disclosure are necessarily 
made in complete ignorance of empirical data or actual outcomes — we know essentially 
nothing about the impact of tax disclosure rules on taxpayer behavior. 
In this paper, we begin to fill the vacuum of empirical evidence about the behavioral 
response to disclosure by offering some evidence from the Japanese experience with 
public disclosure of private tax information. We analyze data on individual and corporate 
(both public and private) taxpayers in Japan, focusing in part on the period surrounding 
the abolition of disclosure in 2004, and look for evidence consistent with a behavioral 
response to income tax disclosure. First, we examine whether individuals who would 
otherwise be just over the threshold for required disclosure responded to the disclosure 
system by manipulating their reported taxable income to fall just below the disclosure 
threshold.11 Specifically, we examine the distribution of implied taxable income just 
above the reporting threshold, and find that a non-trivial number of individual taxpayers 
manipulated their income so as to avoid disclosure, creating “missing tax returns” in the 
distribution of reported taxable income. This suggests that part of the response to the 
Japanese disclosure system was in the opposite direction (i.e., toward reduced reports 
of tax liability) than that stressed by supporters of disclosure. We obtain this result for all 
of the years of taxable income for which we have data, and the finding is robust to a 
variety of assumptions about our estimation techniques. 
We then extend this analysis to the population of Japanese corporations that were 
subject to disclosure. We find evidence similar to that found in the individual taxpayer 
data — many corporations manipulated their income so as to avoid disclosure, 
suggesting that, at the threshold, income tax disclosure results in decreased reported 
taxable income. However, while there are no publicly available data to examine the effect 
of disclosure on the entire distribution of individuals’ reported taxable income, the same 
                                                 
10
 For more examples, see Benedict and Lupert (1978), Blank (2009, 2012), Guttman (2000), Kornhauser 
(2002, 2005, 2010), Laury and Wallace (2005), Linder (1990), Mazza (2003), Pomp (1993), Schwartz 
(2008), Thorndike (2009a, 2009b), and Zaritsky (1974).   
11
 In the absence of the required data (data for individuals below the threshold, or data for the period after 
disclosure), we are unable to answer questions regarding the effect of disclosure on the reported taxable 
income of the entire distribution of income. 
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is not true of corporations. In order to examine the effect of the disclosure system on 
corporations, we examine Japanese firms’ implied taxable income to determine whether 
the abolition of the disclosure system resulted in a decrease of taxable income. Our 
analysis of corporations’ financial data offers no evidence that these companies’ taxable 
income declined after the end of the disclosure system. In sum, we find that both 
corporate and individual taxpayers perceive disclosure as costly and want to avoid it but, 
for corporate taxpayers, the disclosure regime does not appear to increase firms’ 
reported taxable income. 
This research makes several contributions. First, it offers what is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first evidence regarding taxpayer response to a system of income tax 
disclosure. 12   It suggests that in regimes where disclosure is not universal, one 
consequence will be taxpayer efforts to avoid disclosure, implying that both firms and 
individuals perceive tax disclosure as imposing costs on them. Second, it contributes to 
the literature on taxable income elasticity by documenting that the taxable income of both 
individuals and firms in Japan in the neighborhood of the income threshold is subject to 
manipulation, and therefore somewhat elastic. Indeed, public disclosure is an example of 
a tax system instrument whose setting affects the elasticity of taxable income to tax rate 
changes, in line with the observation developed in Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) that this 
elasticity is endogenous to a range of tax policy instruments.  
The paper proceeds in six parts. In Section II, we motivate the paper and discuss the 
history of income tax disclosure in both the United States and Japan. Section II 
discusses the behavioral response we expect to see in response to income tax 
disclosure. Section IV presents our results regarding the response of individuals to 
income tax disclosure. Section V provides evidence of the response of firms to tax 
disclosure. Section VI concludes. 
 
2. Motivation 
The debate over income tax disclosure has a long history, particularly in the United 
                                                 
12
 Laury and Wallace (2005) use experimental methods to analyze the relationship between the 
perceptions of confidentiality and taxpayer compliance, and find some evidence suggesting that when 
individuals perceive a breach of confidentiality, they increase their level of compliance. 
 
39 
 
States. Supporters of income tax disclosure have long argued that it improves income 
tax compliance. One of its early American supporters, progressive Senator Robert 
LaFollette, Jr., argued in the 1930s that if a person “knows that his return is a matter of 
public record, he will hesitate a long time before he will resort to any device designed to 
relieve him of his fair share of the tax.”13 Others have argued that the information 
provided by public disclosure enriches the public debate about tax policy by revealing, 
for example, the extent of income inequality.14 Many other benefits of disclosure have 
been claimed. For example, H.R. 1556, a bill proposed in April of 2003 which would have 
mandated corporate income tax disclosure in the United States for public corporations, 
asserted that its objective was to “facilitate analysis of financial statements, to permit 
inspection of true corporate tax liability and understand the tax strategies undertaken by 
corporations, to discourage abusive tax sheltering activities, and to restore investor 
confidence in publicly traded corporations (U.S. Congress, 2003).”15 
Opponents of income tax disclosure have objected to the associated invasion of privacy. 
An opponent of the earlier U.S. disclosure regime, Senator Louis Murphy (D-IA), stated 
that disclosing income tax data is equivalent to taking “the curtains and shades from the 
homes of our taxpayers and pull[ing] out the walls of the bathroom to assure that the 
Peeping Toms shall have full and unobstructed opportunity to feast their eyes on the [tax 
return] (Leff, 1984, pp. 70–71).”  Some who oppose disclosure worry that public access 
to such information will expose taxpayers, particularly wealthy ones, to those who might 
take advantage of that information. This was also one of the principal arguments made 
leading up to the elimination after 2005 of the Japanese system (Tax Advisory 
Commission, 2005). Similarly, opponents of corporate tax disclosure assert that 
disclosure would result in unnecessary loss of proprietary information for firms (Lenter, 
                                                 
13
 Robert LaFollette, Jr., in U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2nd session, 
1934, 78, pt 6:6553, cited in Leff (1984, p. 69). 
14
 For example, in the 1980s, the Citizens for Tax Justice used accounting data and calculated the 
effective tax rates for many public firms, and publicized the result. They decried the fact that many firms 
were paying very little in corporate income tax. It was the publicity given to this (already public but seldom 
examined) tax information that enriched the public debate on corporate tax reform, and, in part, brought 
about the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Pomp, 1993).  
15
 One additional advantage of disclosure is that it could improve private contracting. Instead of relying on 
information directly shared between contracting parties (which could be subject to manipulation, and has 
costs related to providing that information), contracting parties concerned with the counterparties’ ability to 
fulfill a contract could obtain some information about the other parties’ financial condition via their disclosed 
tax report. 
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Shackelford, and Slemrod, 2003). 
A. Experience with Disclosure in the United States and Other Countries 
Disclosure has figured prominently in the history of the U.S. income tax.16 The first U.S. 
income tax, enacted during the Civil War, included publicity features. The 1862 Act 
permitted the public to examine the names of taxpayers and the amounts of their tax 
liabilities and, with the Revenue Act of 1864, newspapers started to publish lists of 
taxpayers, their reported incomes, and the amounts of taxes they paid. In 1871, the 
income tax was allowed to expire, in part, because of privacy concerns (Pomp, 1993).  
The modern U.S. income tax was introduced in 1913, and the Revenue Act of June 2, 
1924 made public the names and addresses of individuals and corporations filing returns 
along with their respective tax payments. Before the 1924 elections, newspapers across 
the country published the names and tax payments of large companies, celebrities, and 
local residents. President Calvin Coolidge, elected in 1924, and his Secretary of 
Treasury, Andrew Mellon, vigorously opposed making tax return information public, citing 
privacy and safety reasons for individuals, and suggesting that such disclosures could 
compromise business secrecy.17 In 1926 the law was changed so that only the names 
and addresses of taxpayers were public. 
After a 1934 Senate committee investigating the 1929 stock market crash revealed that 
many wealthy owners of financial institutions had paid no income tax in the years after 
1929, Congress inserted a publicity provision in the 1934 Revenue Act. This provision 
generated intense controversy. One month before tax returns were due to be filed (in 
1935) a campaign to repeal the disclosure provision urged people — many of whom 
were not affected by disclosure — to petition their representatives in Congress to oppose 
disclosure. Soon thereafter Congress repealed the disclosure provisions, which was 
signed into law before the publicity provisions came into effect (Kornhauser, 2002; Leff, 
1984).   
No similar disclosure provision has been implemented since that time in the United 
                                                 
16
 A more complete discussion of tax disclosure in the U.S. and other countries is presented in Lenter, 
Shackelford and Slemrod (2003), on which this discussion draws. 
17
 At the time, an article in The Wall Street Journal highlighted the problem of firms’ proprietary information 
being released, “The extent to which all kinds of persons, partnerships and corporations are swarming to 
collector’s offices, to obtain supposedly useful information about their business competitors, is already a 
scandal” (“Income Tax Absurdities,” The Wall Street Journal, November 3, 1924, p. 1).  
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States at the federal level,18 and there are now stringent provisions that limit the 
dissemination of tax return information, even within the U.S. government.19 However, 
although 1935 marked the end of the public disclosure of income tax information in the 
United States, in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, there was a renewed 
burst of interest in the issue of the public disclosure of corporate tax return information. 
While some tax information had long been revealed in the financial statements filed by 
public companies (Pomp, 1993), the Enron and WorldCom scandals made the public 
(and policy makers) more aware of how little can be ascertained about a firm’s real tax 
payments from its financial statements (McGill and Outslay, 2002; Hanlon, 2003).20 In 
April, 2003 a bill was introduced into Congress that would have provided for public 
disclosure of certain corporate tax return information, including information necessary to 
reconcile the firm’s tax information with its financial statement information; it was not 
enacted. In 2007, U.S. public firms were required to increase their public disclosure of 
information related to uncertain tax positions.21 More recently, an article in The New 
York Times (2010) entitled “Should Tax Bills Be Public Information?” has brought this 
topic back in to the public debate (Bernasek, 2010). President Obama’s 2012 
Framework for Business Tax Reform calls for “improved transparency” through, among 
other means, “greater disclosure of annual corporate income tax payments” (The White 
House and The U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2012, p. 10). All of this debate and 
these policy proposals have occurred in the complete absence of empirical evidence of 
                                                 
18
 A few U.S. states, including Massachusetts and Wisconsin, still have some form of tax disclosure. In 
Wisconsin, this has recently allowed reporters to discover that SC Johnson, a large private firm, remitted 
no Wisconsin income tax from 2000 to 2008 (Johnston, 2011). Investigative journalism is one example of a 
possible use of tax disclosure. 
19
 Many of these restrictions on intergovernmental tax disclosure were put in place in response to Richard 
Nixon’s attempts to obtain taxpayer information from the IRS for political purposes not authorized by law 
(Benedict and Lupert, 1978). Some disclosure within the U.S. government is allowed by §6103(i)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which permits disclosure of tax return data by the IRS to other governmental 
agencies if the information is evidence of the violation of a federal crime. 
20
 As noted by McGill and Outslay (2002) and Hanlon (2003), a public firm’s financial statements are not 
fully revealing about a firm’s actual tax payments made to the IRS. Among other reasons, this is because 
accounting under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and tax accounting under the Internal 
Revenue Code are not identical. 
21
 While FIN 48 (now ASC 740-10) did not mandate the disclosure of actual tax return information, it did 
increase disclosure of tax information for public U.S. firms. Consistent with the findings in this paper, public 
firms appear to have taken actions to avoid this mandated disclosure (Blouin et al., 2010). Inconsistent 
with the findings of our paper but consistent with our hypothesis, there is some preliminary evidence that 
the increased tax disclosure required by FIN 48 (or potentially the forced calculation of the figures to be 
disclosed) reduced firm tax aggressiveness, at least at the state level (Gupta, Mills, and Towery, 2013). 
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taxpayer responses to income tax disclosure.  
While the United State has had, then abolished, and recently debated, public income tax 
disclosure, such systems are in place in several countries. Among Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Norway, 22  Sweden, 
Finland, and Japan (until it was abolished in 2005), allow some form of public access to 
some tax information. Australia is currently considering a new disclosure requirement, 
which would require firms to disclose taxes payable and taxable income (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2013). One important feature of the Australian proposal is that, like the 
disclosure system in Japan, only taxpayers above a certain income threshold (AUD 100 
million) would be subject to the disclosure rule. This proposed feature makes the findings 
of our study, which studies a disclosure regime that applies only to taxpayers above 
certain thresholds, especially relevant. Lastly, while few jurisdictions disclose full tax 
information for their general population, in certain countries, there is public disclosure of 
information about convicted tax evaders. 
B. The Japanese Income Tax Disclosure Regime 
Japan, the setting for our study, implemented a system of tax disclosure in 1950. 
Concern about tax evasion figured prominently in the development of a post-war 
Japanese income tax system. In the thorough post-war income tax revision of 1947, a 
third-party reporting system (offering a reward if the information provided contributed to 
discovering tax evasion) and a tax return inspection system (under which for a fee 
private citizens could inspect all tax returns) were introduced. However, based on the 
Shoup Mission report of 1949, the tax return inspection system was abolished and, in 
1950, the taxpayer “notification system” for high-income taxpayers was introduced in its 
place. The third-party reporting system was abolished in 1954, but the high-income 
taxpayer notification system continued until tax year 2004 for individuals (2005 for 
corporations). The last notification in 2005 (2006) corresponded to tax year 2004 (2005) 
information. 
                                                 
22
 Norwegian tax returns have been public information since 1863, but until 2002 it was only possible to 
see other people’s tax information by applying in person at a tax office. In 2002 the information was 
published, and made easily searchable, on the Internet or through a text-messaging service for mobile 
phones (“Norwegian Tax Office Tells All Online,” BBC News, October 11, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/ 
media_reports/2321301.stm). For an analysis of the consequences of moving disclosed tax information to 
the Internet, see Slemrod, Thoresen, and Bø (2013). 
43 
 
The high-income taxpayer notification system was designed to prevent underestimated 
tax declarations and tax evasion. The idea was that the system would introduce the  
possibility that tax evasion would be discovered by third parties if the amount of a 
declaration was strikingly low compared to the lifestyle and other publicly known 
information about the taxpayers. Under the notification system, the name, address, and 
the amount of taxable income (until tax year 1982) or income tax liability (after 1982) of 
the affected individual taxpayers were publicly posted on a bulletin board in each tax 
office for a period of about two weeks. The information was often collected and published 
by private companies, and frequently attracted media attention. 
Similar aims motivated the corporate notification system, which was introduced at the 
same time. Disclosure applied to corporations whose taxable income exceeded the 
thresholds noted in Table II.1. The information disclosed included the corporate name, 
taxable income, the tax office to which the tax was remitted, the name of the company’s 
president, and the beginning and ending day of the accounting year. The information was 
usually posted publicly at the tax office within three months after the company submitted 
its tax return, and was public for at least one month. Although the corporate tax 
information apparently attracted less frequent media attention than the individual tax 
information, it was at times collected and published by private publishing companies.  
Notably, under the disclosure system it was possible for individuals to avoid the 
notification system by filing a corrected income tax declaration in April after 
underestimating tax liability in an initial return subject to the notification deadline of 
March 31. This would subject the taxpayer to arguably small penalties for arrears and 
understatement. There is, however, no evidence about the extent of this behavior. 
Corporations could not use a similar method because both the initial tax report and any 
corrected tax report were subject to disclosure. However, any corrections initiated by the 
tax authority were not subject to disclosure. There is anecdotal evidence that some 
companies asked the tax authorities to correct their understated tax reports so they could 
avoid notification. There is, however, no systematic evidence about the extent of this 
behavior.23 
                                                 
23
 Anecdotal evidence gathered from conversations with Japanese tax professionals suggests that 
companies would occasionally understate their tax liability to escape disclosure with an implicit 
understanding with the tax office that it would correct the report without penalty, thus undermining the 
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From the beginning of the notification system, disclosure was required only of taxpayers 
whose reports exceeded a high threshold of tax liability or taxable income. Until tax year 
1982 the threshold for individuals was defined in terms of taxable income, and thereafter 
it was defined in terms of tax liability.24 For corporations, the threshold was defined in 
terms of taxable income for all the years of the disclosure regime. The thresholds were 
high enough so that, over the course of the disclosure law, only between 0.9 percent and 
6.7 percent of individual taxpayers were subject to the notification rule. In 2004, 2.4 
percent of all corporations were subject to disclosure. The threshold for disclosure was 
increased five times over its life. Table II.1 presents relevant statistics about the evolution 
of the system.  
In its 2005 report, the Japanese Tax Advisory Commission recommended the elimination 
of the notification system, asserting that it “is being utilized in various ways inconsistent 
with its initial aim, and there are various reports of the disclosure being a factor in 
causing crimes and harassment … Based on circumstances such as these, the system 
of disclosure should be abolished.”25 Following this recommendation, the notification 
system was abolished by the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, which 
became law on April 1, 2005. This Act stipulated that the last notification date for 
individuals was May 31, 2005, and was February, 2006 for corporations.26 
Because the notification process reveals the number and tax liabilities of high-income 
individual taxpayers (and little other information is publicly released about the tax system, 
even in aggregated form), some researchers have used the disclosed information to 
study the effects of tax policies (e.g., Makino, 1997). Others have utilized the longitudinal 
nature of the data to study the evolution of individual incomes in Japan.27 Researchers 
have also used the corporate tax disclosure data to evaluate properties of book-tax 
differences for Japanese firms (Goto, Hirohisa, and Yamashita, 2007). But the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                             
disclosure but not underpaying their tax liability. 
24
 The Japanese tax year for most individuals is January 1 to December 31. 
25
 See Tax Advisory Commission (2005) — translation provided by Lingua Science Corporation of Ann 
Arbor, MI. The Tax Advisory Commission was established by the Japanese government in 1953 to review 
the tax system and to formulate annual tax changes as well as long-run tax policy (Ishi, 1993). 
26
 Disclosure has returned to Japan. As of March 31, 2010, the Financial Services Agency requires 
corporate executives with salaries exceeding ¥100 million to publicly disclose their salaries. 
27
 For example, see Hashimoto (1995). Moriguchi and Saez (2008), in their study of the evolution of 
income concentration in Japan from 1885 to 2002, use different data sources. Ichikawa (1991) uses the 
notification data to analyze earnings patterns by occupation and educational status.  
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the disclosure system itself on taxpayer behavior has not been studied empirically 
heretofore. 
 
3. How public disclosure affects taxpayer behavior 
Taxpayer responses to disclosure hinge upon whether they consider disclosure to 
present a cost or provide a benefit.  It is possible that taxpayers view disclosure of 
income as a positive signal of their success, gaining from the publicity of publicly 
revealed evidence of their high income. If this is the case, we may expect taxpayers to 
take actions to make disclosure more likely in order to receive the publicity that public 
disclosure would provide. 
Alternatively, in what we consider the more plausible case, if the disclosure system 
imposed (avoidable) real costs on taxpayers, then one would expect to see a behavioral 
response to the system of disclosure. This will be the case whether these costs are those 
claimed by supporters of tax disclosure (increasing the costs of income tax 
noncompliance by increasing the probability of detection), or those claimed by 
opponents of disclosure (privacy costs for individual taxpayers or proprietary costs for 
firms). If, in addition, taxpayers are able to manipulate taxable income so as to avoid 
disclosure, we would expect that some taxpayers manipulate their reported taxable 
income so as to fall below the disclosure threshold.   
If, as is reasonable, the costs of manipulating one’s income are increasing in the amount 
of manipulation needed to escape disclosure, then the frequency of reports with taxable 
income or tax liability just above the threshold should be less than what it would be in the 
absence of a disclosure rule, and the discrepancy should decline as taxable income 
increases above the threshold.28 This hypothesis is consistent with the (heretofore 
untested) claim in Lenter, Shackelford and Slemrod (2003, p. 826) that “if disclosure is 
costly, then some [taxpayers] will respond to disclosure by [taking actions] to avoid the 
disclosure requirements.” 
 
                                                 
28
 This is similar to several recent papers that examine taxpayer behavior around notches and kinks, using 
taxpayers’ bunching around thresholds to examine taxpayer behavior (Slemrod, 2010). For example, Saez 
(2010) uses kinks in both the earned income tax credit and the individual income tax rate schedule to 
estimate individuals’ compensated elasticity of taxable income. As in Saez (2010), we use taxpayer 
behavior around a threshold to make inferences about taxpayer behavior. 
46 
 
4. Analysis of individual income tax disclosure data 
A. Data Source 
In order to examine the behavioral response of individual taxpayers to the disclosure 
system, we analyze data from the tax years 2001, 2002, and 2003. These data include 
information about tax liability and an estimate of the taxable income corresponding to the 
tax liability. These data were purchased from General Legal Security, Inc., a Japanese 
company that compiles the data from the public notification records.29   
B. Analysis 
We begin our examination of the behavioral response to the abolition of the Japanese 
disclosure system by examining the distribution of taxable income obtained from the 
disclosure data, and searching for “missing tax returns” immediately above the 
disclosure threshold. This, of course, requires an assumption about the counterfactual 
distribution for taxable income. There is considerable evidence that, absent disclosure, 
income for the top percentiles of the individual income distribution follows a Pareto 
distribution.30 Piketty and Saez (2006), and Moriguchi and Saez (2008) for Japan in 
particular, argue that the Pareto distribution is a reasonable approximation for top 
incomes.31 Given this assumption, we analyze the micro-disclosure data to determine 
whether there is evidence in the disclosure data of “missing tax returns” with taxable 
incomes corresponding to tax liabilities just above the disclosure threshold.  
To do this, we first use a maximum-likelihood procedure to estimate the parameters of a 
Pareto distribution based on the disclosure information. We then compare the actual 
number of returns just above the threshold to the predicted number of returns based on 
the estimated Pareto distribution.
32
 Observing “too few” actual tax returns with taxable 
                                                 
29
 The company claimed in its online advertising that the sale of these data online, claiming that the 
compilation follows the regulations of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information. Note that, although 
the name and address of the individual taxpayers are included in the public disclosure, they are not part of 
the database that is available for purchase. Other databases, such as the Who’s Who, do have this 
information for some years, but not in electronic form. In scattered cases the publishers supplemented the 
disclosure data with information about occupation. While ideally we would like to obtain some taxpayer 
identifier and link taxpayers over time to examine behavior over time, we have not been able to obtain 
such an identifier.  
30
 Pen (1971) discusses the basis for this claim and theories about why it might be true. 
31
 Our analysis below is necessarily based on imputed taxable income, a slightly different concept from 
the one studied by, for example, Piketty and Saez (2006), who focus on gross income (before deductions) 
reported on tax returns. 
32
 Since 1999 the disclosure thresholds have always been higher than the threshold for the top marginal 
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income immediately above the threshold would be consistent with some taxpayers 
manipulating their tax liabilities in order to avoid public disclosure. This manipulation may 
take the form of illegally not reporting taxable income (tax evasion), increasing tax 
deductions or tax credits and legally decreasing the tax liability (such as increasing the 
amount of charitable contributions during the year), delaying the receipt of income until 
the following tax year (timing effects), or simply generating less taxable income (by 
working less or curtailing business activities).  
Below, we report several variations of our estimates of the number of “missing tax 
returns” due to manipulation, and explain our robustness tests. We find that our results 
are robust to the use of these alternative procedures. We perform these calculations for 
tax year 2003, and then briefly summarize similar findings obtained for tax years 2001 
and 2002. 
1. Estimation Based on Reported Individual Taxable Income 
We begin by estimating the distribution of individual taxable income. The advantage of 
focusing on income is that the prior literature concludes that top incomes follow a Pareto 
distribution (Moriguchi and Saez, 2008). The disadvantage is that we do not have 
information on actual reported taxable income, but rather have to estimate taxable 
income using tax liability. This is done by “grossing up” the tax liability by the applicable 
statutory tax schedule to arrive at an estimate of taxable income.33 This assumes a 
predictable mapping between taxable income and tax liability, which is likely to introduce 
some error into our measure of taxable income (for example, by ignoring tax credits for 
individual taxpayers). However, there is no reason to believe that the conversion of tax 
liability to taxable income would bias our estimate of the extent of “missing” tax returns.  
Using these taxable incomes, we estimate the Pareto parameter with a maximum 
likelihood procedure using all the disclosed tax returns for tax year 2003. 34  This 
                                                                                                                                                             
tax rate (the top rate has applied to income over ¥18 million from 1999 to 2013), so we are not in danger of 
conflating responses to marginal tax rates with responses to disclosure rules.  
33
 For example, the ¥10 million (approximately $97,000 in 2005) tax liability threshold corresponds to 
¥34,432,000 (approximately $332,000 in 2005) of taxable income according to the formula used by the 
data provider. The general formula is: estimated taxable income = (tax liability + 2,740,000)/0.37, where 37 
percent was the top statutory marginal tax rate throughout our sample period. 
34
 We performed extensive analyses examining whether the lognormal distribution would be an 
appropriate alternative to the Pareto distribution. Our analyses revealed that the lognormal distribution 
does not fit the upper portion of Japanese income well, and that the Pareto distribution achieves a much 
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produces an estimated Pareto index of 2.213. The top panel of Figure II.1 shows a 
histogram of taxable income, where the bin width is ¥338,435, as well as the estimated 
Pareto distribution for taxable incomes between the disclosure threshold of  
¥34,432,000 and ¥ 50 million. The comparison suggests that there are fewer returns 
reported just above the disclosure cutoff in the empirical distribution than in the 
estimated Pareto distribution.35  
In order to quantify the extent of this phenomenon, we next compare the estimated 
Pareto distribution to a non-parametric, kernel density estimation, with a bandwidth of 
¥1,037,694, to the actual probability density function.36 We use the Epanechnikov kernel 
function and Silverman’s optimal bandwidth technique, as used as the default procedure 
in STATA, and a boundary correction procedure.37 The estimated Pareto distribution and 
the kernel density estimate are shown together in the lower panel of Figure II.1. The 
kernel density estimate lies clearly below the estimated Pareto distribution for disclosed 
incomes close to the threshold.  
We can derive an estimate of the number of “missing” returns by calculating the area 
between the two curves in the range between the threshold and where the estimated 
Pareto probability density function first clearly crosses the kernel density function 
(indicated with a vertical line).38 When we do so, we get an estimate of 870 missing 
                                                                                                                                                             
superior fit. The Pareto probability density function is  f (x) = ak
a
x
-(a +1)
, x ³ k . We refer to a as the 
Pareto parameter. The procedure uses the paretofit command that can be downloaded from Statistical 
Software Components (at “Boston College Department of Economics Statistical Software Components,” 
Boston College, http://ideas.repec.org/s/boc/bocode.html). 
35
 An extremely useful test would examine the distribution of taxable incomes just below the disclosure 
threshold.  However, because our data are made available as a result of the disclosure requirement, we 
cannot pursue such an approach. 
36
 The kernel density estimator is a generalization of a histogram estimator to obtain smoother density 
estimates than a histogram density estimator. The kernel density estimates are obtained by choosing a 
kernel function and a smoothing parameter (bandwidth). See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for the details of 
the derivation of the kernel density estimator and the optimal bandwidth choice. 
37
 The boundary correction procedure makes use of the kdens command that can be downloaded from 
Statistical Software Components (at “Boston College Department of Economics Statistical Software 
Components,” Boston College, http://ideas.repec.org/s/boc/bocode.html). We also repeated the procedure 
using twice, and half, the Silverman bandwidth. Using twice the bandwidth generates results that are very 
similar to the reported results. In some cases, using half the bandwidth approximately halves the estimated 
number of cases (but keeps the estimated percentage of “missing” returns about the same) because the 
estimated kernel density first intersects the estimated Pareto distribution at a lower value of taxable 
income. This is not surprising because reducing the bandwidth reduces the smoothness of the kernel 
density and so makes it more likely that at some point its density exceeds the density of the estimated 
Pareto distribution. 
38
 The use of the point where the kernel density function and the Pareto distribution intersect is somewhat 
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returns, which is 4.1 percent of the number of returns predicted by the Pareto distribution. 
It is important to note that, as previously mentioned, the cost of manipulating one’s 
income to below the threshold is plausibly increasing in the distance from the threshold. 
This is consistent with the data, as the “missing tax returns” seem to be primarily located 
near the threshold, and then dissipate as one moves further from the threshold. 
The behavioral response to the disclosure system is almost certainly understated by the 
procedure just described because the Pareto parameter is estimated including the range 
of returns we hypothesize are affected by the manipulated responses themselves. In 
other words, the Pareto parameter meant to approximate the counterfactual is based on 
a distribution of taxable income with some returns that are absent — the returns whose 
tax liability was manipulated so as not to be disclosed. To investigate this issue, we 
repeat the previous exercise, but estimate the Pareto parameter using only the reports 
with tax liabilities that exceed ¥40,039,000 of estimated taxable income, at which point 
the two curves of the kernel density estimate and the fitted Pareto distribution first 
intersect. Note that the Pareto parameter estimated in this alternative manner should be 
higher, if as hypothesized there are “missing” returns just above the threshold. Indeed, 
the estimate is higher than before, 2.256 compared to 2.213. 
Comparing the newly estimated Pareto distribution to the distribution from the kernel 
density procedure suggests that the number of missing returns is 1,221, or 5.3 percent of 
the number of returns predicted by the Pareto distribution. Thus, using this procedure 
produces an estimate of the extent of the missing disclosed returns that is 40 percent 
higher than the previous method. The relevant graphs are shown in Figure II.2. 
While we obtain a point estimate of 870 missing returns using all disclosed tax 
information, this estimate does not suggest the likelihood that such an estimate could be 
obtained as a result of random chance. To establish that our results are statistically 
significant, we perform a bootstrapping test. We use our estimated Pareto parameter, 
2.213, and the threshold value, ¥34,432,000, to generate 73,936 observations selected 
from the Pareto distribution (this is the number of observations in the disclosure data in 
2003). We then obtain a kernel density estimate using these data, and calculate the 
                                                                                                                                                             
arbitrary. It may be the case that individuals who are missing from the distribution as a result of the 
disclosure system would be present in the distribution in the absence of the disclosure system to the right 
of this intersection, or to the left of it. We calculate using the intersection only for convenience. 
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implied number of “missing tax returns” by comparing the Pareto distribution to the kernel 
density estimate. We perform this procedure 1,000 times, and calculate the number of 
times an estimate as large as the one we obtained from the actual disclosure data, 870, 
would be obtained from randomly generated observations that truly follow a Pareto 
density function. Of the 1,000 times we perform this procedure, the maximum number of 
implied “missing tax returns” is 666, and the minimum is 2, with a mean number of 
“missing tax returns” equal to 243. This means that in exactly zero out of 1000 draws a 
random generation of data from a Pareto distribution yields a value greater than the 
estimate of 870 missing tax returns generated from the actual disclosure data. This 
translates into a highly significant bootstrapped estimate of a p-value related to our 
estimate of “missing tax returns”. 
We also conduct a Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test in order to corroborate our 
bootstrapped estimates. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov procedure tests whether the actual 
empirical distribution of data is the same as a hypothesized distribution of the data. In our 
case, our null hypothesis is that taxable income follows a Pareto distribution, which 
would suggest no manipulation to avoid disclosure. We test this null hypothesis on 
several portions of the empirical distribution of taxable income. First, in the region 
between ¥34,432,000 and ¥40,039,000, where our prediction of manipulation to avoid 
disclosure would be consistent with a rejection of the null hypothesis, it is rejected. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that between ¥34,432,000 and ¥40,039,000 the 
empirical data are statistically different (at a p=0.011 level) from a Pareto distribution.  
However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for other portions of the distribution of 
taxable incomes. For incomes between 40.039 and 50 million, 50 and 60 million, 60 and 
70 million, 70 and 80 million, 80 and 90 million, and 90 to 100 million yen, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that the empirical distribution found in the 
disclosures is statistically indistinguishable from the Pareto distribution. These results 
both confirm our prediction of manipulation near the threshold (resulting in a deviation 
from the Pareto distribution), and confirm that assuming a Pareto distribution is justified 
for the unmanipulated portion of the distribution of taxable income. 
2. Results for Tax Years 2001 and 2002 
To check that the previously described results for tax year 2003 were not an anomaly, we 
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repeated the same tests for tax years 2001 and 2002. The results are summarized in 
Table II.2, which reveals that we obtain very similar results for 2001 and 2002 as we find 
for 2003. For each of the two methodologies, the estimated number of missing returns in 
2002 is below the estimated number in either 2001 or 2003. The details of these 
calculations are available from the authors. 
3. A False Experiment Robustness Test 
As another robustness test we repeat our methodology using four arbitrarily picked 
threshold levels, all of which exceed the real threshold level of ¥34,432,000.39 We 
conduct the exact same analysis as when using the real threshold, discarding all data 
below our new arbitrary thresholds, and estimating the number of “missing returns” 
based only on incomes above the arbitrarily chosen thresholds. In all four cases, our 
method produces a trivially small number of “missing returns.” For example, when we 
use ¥70 million as our false experiment threshold, we obtain a Pareto parameter of 2.229, 
and estimate a total of three missing returns, compared to 870 using the actual 
disclosure threshold. We obtain similar results when we examine the false thresholds of 
50 million, 60 million, and 80 million yen. This result suggests that our missing returns 
are not merely a result of our distributional assumption or some other methodological 
problem. 
4. A Potential Alternative Explanation 
The presence of some gap in density just over the threshold is also consistent with 
disclosure causing people to increase their reported income. To see this, imagine that 
disclosure causes that all taxpayers subject to disclosure to increase their reported 
income by 100 yen.40 Then no one would report between, for example (for firms), ¥ 40 
million and ¥ 40,000,100, and the density of the rest of the distribution to the right of the 
threshold would increase imperceptibly. This would occur if taxpayers whose (previously 
optimal) reported income lay above the threshold would increase reported income if they 
                                                 
39
 Because the data are unavailable due to the nature of the disclosure system, we cannot investigate an 
arbitrarily lower threshold. 
40
 This also requires that taxpayers under the threshold do not over-report to be disclosed (as they could 
perceive that not being disclosed signals their income is below the threshold, which could increase the 
threat of reporting by peers who believe the taxpayer to have a true income that merits disclosure). 
Hasseldine et al. (2007) provides evidence that taxpayers that fall below (non-public) disclosure thresholds 
may increase their declared income and subject themselves to increased disclosure if subjected to 
potential tax authority scrutiny.  
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felt that disclosure increased the probability that understatement would be detected and 
punished (and if this decrease in probability outweighed the extra tax liability they would 
incur from reporting additional income). In addition, someone whose optimal reported 
income had been just above the threshold would need to weigh the benefit of 
under-reporting enough to avoid disclosure against the cost of deviating from their 
otherwise-optimal report (i.e., and the associated increase in tax authority scrutiny from 
under-reporting).  
Further, we observe that the hole in the distribution seems to be decreasing in size with 
the distance from the threshold, which is consistent with the expected cost of 
under-reporting increasing with its magnitude. Lastly, anecdotal evidence is rich with 
assertions that taxpayers under-report to avoid disclosure, but we have not heard 
examples of people over-reporting because of disclosure. Nevertheless, taxpayer 
over-reporting as a result of disclosure could be part of the explanation for what we 
observe.41 
 
5. Analysis of corporate income tax data 
A. Data Source 
Our examination of the behavioral response of corporate taxpayers to the system of tax 
disclosure begins with an analysis of income tax disclosure data from the 2005 calendar 
year. This data set includes 68,824 observations, with information about taxable income 
(current and the previous three years if disclosed), corporation name, the tax office to 
which the tax was remitted, business sector, whether the company is public or private, 
the name of the company’s president,42 and the beginning and ending month of the 
accounting year.43 The corporate data were purchased from Diamond, Inc., a Japanese 
company that compiles the data from the public notification records and other publicly 
available information. 
                                                 
41
 We are grateful to Brian Erard for clarifying this issue to us. 
42
 All text-based data that we have obtained is available only in Kanji (or the native character system for 
the foreign firms operating in Japan), which has limited our ability to use these data.  
43
 Most companies’ accounting periods span one year. The data show that a small fraction of companies 
(1,608 of 68,824) have accounting periods shorter than one year, of which 289 have a half year or shorter 
accounting period. For this latter group, the disclosure threshold was ¥20 million rather than ¥40 million. In 
the analysis that follows we exclude all the companies with an accounting period that is six months or less. 
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B. Analysis of Disclosure Data 
We follow the same procedure as outlined above to analyze the corporate data, 
assuming that the distribution of disclosed corporate taxable incomes in the upper tail 
follows a Pareto distribution. We assume a Pareto distribution in order to be consistent 
with our analysis for individual taxpayers, because doing so seems to fit the data well, 
and because several corporate-level attributes have been found to be distributed 
following the Pareto distribution. For example, Axtell (2001) notes that employees, 
revenue, and market capitalization all follow a Pareto distribution.  The estimated 
Pareto index for reported corporate income in the 2005 calendar year is 0.860 when 
estimated over all observations, and is 0.900 when using only observations with reported 
taxable income over ¥75,022,000, at which point the two curves of the kernel density 
estimate and the fitted Pareto distribution based on the former Pareto parameter (0.860) 
first intersect (where we argue the “unmanipulated returns” begin).44 The top panel of 
Figure II.3 shows a histogram of corporate taxable income, where the bin width is 
¥1,111,089, as well as the estimated Pareto distribution of corporate taxable income 
between the threshold, ¥40 million, and ¥90 million. The lower panel of Figure II.3 
compares the estimated kernel density for taxable incomes below ¥90 million, with 
bandwidth of ¥3,497,544, to the former estimated Pareto distribution, while Figure II.4 
does the same for the latter estimated Pareto distribution.  
As with the individual data, we find evidence that is consistent with behavior designed to 
avoid disclosure. The number of missing returns based on the Pareto distribution 
estimated from all disclosed returns is 1,380 (4.9 percent of the number of returns 
predicted by the Pareto distribution), while the number based only on the “unmanipulated” 
returns is 2,449 (7.4 percent of the number of returns predicted by the Pareto 
distribution); this compares to 68,824 corporations that disclosed taxable income, and 
2,915,259 corporations overall. These estimates are almost twice as high as the 
estimates for individual tax returns calculated above. 
The phenomenon of companies understating taxable income to just below 40 million yen 
in order to avoid disclosure was well-known during the disclosure era, if rarely publicly 
                                                 
44
 We obtained corporate data only for 2005. Thus we cannot pursue the possibility that corporate 
behavior may have been different in 2005 than in other years (especially years not so close to the abolition 
of disclosure). 
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discussed. Indeed, the practice was common enough to have merited a moniker: “39 
companies.”  Anecdotally, these “39 companies” manipulated their taxable income so 
as to fall below the threshold in part so they could hide their profitability from suppliers 
who might seek better contractual terms from an apparently more profitable firm. 
Note also that most of the companies around the disclosure threshold, where we find 
evidence of under-reporting to avoid disclosure, are not particularly large and are 
generally not public corporations that of necessity must provide financial information to 
the public on a regular basis. For example, of the 1,000 smallest firms on the disclosure 
list (those that fall just above the threshold) in 2005, only one of them is a public 
corporation. It is reasonable to expect that, for public firms which face capital markets 
pressures and must report financial information to the public, the effect of disclosure 
might be different. For example, Rice (1992) finds that private firms are more tax 
aggressive than public firms, likely because private firms face fewer constraints on 
disclosing lower taxable incomes. 
C. Analysis of Public Corporate Financial Data 
1. Hypothesis and Test Design 
To this point all of the analysis has been directed toward the hypothesis that some 
taxpayers will understate their reports in order to avoid disclosure. Another important 
issue, one that underlies much of the support for disclosure, is whether taxpayers subject 
to disclosure will restrain their under-reporting because of a fear that the public nature of 
their report will raise suspicion about under-reporting, and ultimately increase the chance 
of detection and punishment for noncompliance. Investigating this hypothesis is, 
however, hampered by the fact that, by its nature, the disclosure data are not available 
after the notification system was abolished. 
However, for public corporations, the situation is more promising because firms’ publicly 
disclosed financial statements are available both before and after abolition, and from 
these financial statements it is possible to estimate a firm’s taxable income. 45 To 
                                                 
45
 Actual taxable income is not available from financial statements, as the financial reporting system in 
Japan (as in the United States) does not require taxable income as calculated for the firm’s financial 
statements to conform completely with taxable income from the firm’s tax return (although the degree of 
conformity is much greater than in the United States). As a result, we estimate taxable income by grossing 
up the current tax expense of the firm by the top corporate statutory rate (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
Our estimates of taxable income seem reasonable when compared with the disclosed taxable income 
figures available under the tax disclosure system; the correlation between the two measures exceeds 0.75. 
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examine whether public firms altered their taxable income after the abolition of the 
disclosure system, we next analyze data from Compustat Global, which contains 
financial statement information about public firms located throughout the world. Our 
sample consists of the universe of firms covered by Compustat Global incorporated in 
Japan for which the relevant financial statement data are available for all the years 
considered.46    
We estimate the model 
(1) TIDiffit = b0 +b1Treatmentit +b2UnemDifft +b3UnemDiffSqt +b4IndustryFixedEffectsi , 
where TIDiff it denotes firm i’s estimated taxable income in year t less the firm’s estimated 
taxable income in year t-1, scaled by total assets in year t-1; Treatment is one if the firm 
was subject to disclosure in year t-1 but not in year t, and zero otherwise; UnemDiff  is 
the average monthly unemployment rate, as defined by the OECD, in year t minus the 
average monthly unemployment rate in year t-1; UnemDiffSq equals (UnemDiff)2 ; and 
Industry Fixed Effects is a vector of dummy variables indicating membership in a specific 
industry (where industries are defined by two-digit SIC-type codes) 
We define Treatment using both the fiscal year end of the firm and the year in which the 
observation occurs. Our identification strategy relies upon the fact that the law mandated 
that disclosure would be abolished in February, 2006. However, because firms have two 
or three (depending on the type of company) months to file their tax returns, and some 
time is required for the National Tax Authority to process and disclose the returns, we 
observe that almost no public firms disclosed that had fiscal year ends in November  
2005, and that no firms disclosed with fiscal year ends in December and thereafter. Thus, 
a firm with an October 2005 fiscal year end was likely to face disclosure (subject only to 
being above the threshold level of taxable income, which is likely for a public firm), while 
a firm with a fiscal year end of November 2005 and thereafter was not likely to face 
                                                                                                                                                             
While the imputation of taxable income from financial statements introduces some noise into our measure 
of taxable income, this is unlikely to bias our results because we are identifying our effect from fiscal-year 
ends and the calendar year in which an observation occurred. We know of no major change in the 
difference between book and tax accounting that affected firms with certain fiscal year ends differently than 
firms with other fiscal year ends in 2005.    
46
 To minimize the influence of outliers, we winsorize TIDiff at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels for all of 
our specifications. Winsorizing, discussed in Tukey (1962), is a standard procedure in analysis of 
corporate financial data (Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003; Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod, 2007). 
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disclosure.47 Therefore, we define Treatment as a dummy variable that equals one if 
t=2005 and the fiscal year end of a firm was November or December or if t=2006 and the 
fiscal year end of a firm was between January and October, and equals zero otherwise.  
The unemployment variables are intended to control for the effect of cyclical and secular 
economic conditions that would affect true, and therefore possibly reported, changes in 
corporate earnings. We include industry fixed effects to allow for any other systematic 
differences in firms from different industries. Given that industry membership is highly 
correlated with the fiscal month end of a firm, industry effects also partially control for 
systematic differences in firms with different fiscal year end months.48   
2. Results from Public Firm Data   
We start by presenting the data visually. Figure II.5 depicts the mean and the median 
TIDiff by fiscal year end for the time period for which continuous data are available, from 
June 1992 to February 2010, with a vertical line indicating roughly where disclosure was 
no longer  required of firms (after October 2005). Figure II.6 focuses on a 24-month 
window, starting from six months before the end of disclosure to 18 months after it ended. 
The figures do not provide clear visual evidence of distinctly lower values of TIDiff in the 
year after disclosure was abolished. However, there is a clear trend downward beginning 
in about 2007. While this downward trend in taxable income may have been in part the 
result of the abolition of disclosure, we have no way of compellingly identifying that this is 
the case.  
We estimate the above regression with all the data available from Compustat Global, 
which includes observations from 1992 to 2010. This panel of data includes 59,667 
observations and 4,714 unique firms.49 The results of this regression are shown in Table 
                                                 
47 We considered coding the Treatment variable using the actual disclosure data to specify which 
firms actually faced disclosure ex post. However, this has two serious problems. First, it assumes 
that firms who were ultimately not disclosed anticipated non-disclosure and acted accordingly; 
this may not be the case. Second, and more importantly, given that some firms did face disclosure 
because their income turned out to be under the threshold limit of income, coding Treatment 
using ex post disclosure data would mechanically be related to firms having lower income and 
thus would create an endogeneity problem that would undermine a causal interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients.  
48 For example, in Japan firms with March fiscal year ends are on average larger than other firms, 
and there are many more March fiscal year end firms than any other month.  
49 These 4,714 firms over the entire 1992–2010 period contrast to the 68,824 firms that were 
subject to disclosure in calendar year 2005. The set of firms used for this test and for our 
distribution fitting are thus fundamentally different sets of firms. 
57 
 
II.3, using the least absolute deviation estimator in Column 1, and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) in Column 2. Notably the estimated coefficient on the treatment dummy for both 
specifications is positive; using two-way clustering of standard errors by year and fiscal 
year end month (for the OLS estimator), this estimated coefficient is statistically different 
from zero at a one percent level. 
The estimated positive sign is inconsistent with the hypothesis that disclosure restrains 
aggressive tax behavior. There are several possible explanations for this result, which 
highlight the limitations in interpreting our estimated coefficients. First, because the 
Japanese accounting system for public firms is highly conformed, the tax situation of 
public corporations in Japan is effectively disclosed even in the absence of the 
notification system.50 This is not inconsistent with our earlier finding that a non-trivial 
amount of firms understated their taxable income to avoid disclosure, because this 
finding related to relatively small, mostly non-public corporations. As mentioned above, 
of the 1,000 disclosed firms with the smallest disclosed tax liability, only one was a public 
corporation.  
Another caveat to our identification strategy is that it relies upon firms being able to 
perfectly anticipate the end of the disclosure system, and react quickly to it by changing 
their tax avoidance strategies. Absent this assumption, we would be left with trying to 
attribute the change in taxable incomes after 2007 to the end of disclosure, which is 
infeasible. Finally, our strategy assumes that tax disclosure was the only factor 
differentially affecting treated observations and untreated observations. For example, we 
rule out the possibility that the Japanese tax authority considered tax disclosure as part 
of their enforcement policy arsenal and, given its abolition, increased their level of tax 
auditing, which may have resulted in increased tax compliance (Slemrod, Blumenthal, 
and Christian, 2001; Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman, 2012).  
We performed many robustness tests to see how sensitive the above results are to 
different specifications. First, we included year fixed effects, to better control for 
macroeconomic factors that change by year, and affect all firms the same. Including year 
                                                 
50
 Japan’s book and tax systems, while not completely conformed, are more closely conformed than most 
other countries. Indeed, in a sample of 33 major countries, Atwood, Drake and Myers (2010) find that 
Japan has the fifth most book-tax conformed system.  
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fixed effects yields results that are similar to those tabulated.51 We also estimate the 
model with pre-tax book income as the dependent variable to account for the fact that 
estimating taxable income introduces error into the measurement of taxable income by, 
for example, under-estimating taxable income for firms which have tax credits that 
decrease their current tax expense. Doing this yields similar coefficients on the treatment 
indicator.52   
Finally, we estimated our model using a more limited time series, constraining the control 
group of untreated firms-years. This may yield different estimates if, for example, there 
was some large structural change in the Japanese economy not captured by our control 
variables (including our year fixed effects) that made the earlier portion of the time series 
incomparable to the later time period. We restrict our sample to the year in which the 
regime change took place (the Japanese fiscal year 2005, which includes April 2005–
March 2006), essentially comparing the differenced taxable incomes of firms with fiscal 
year ends in March 2005 to October 2005 to firms with fiscal year ends November 2005 
to February 2006. This generates a negative and significant estimated coefficient on the 
treatment indicator, the opposite sign to what we found in the specifications discussed 
above, which is consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure restrained aggressive tax 
planning. This result is not definitive because we cannot confidently argue that there was 
not a large, relevant structural shift in the Japanese economy during our sample period 
not captured by our control variables.53 The result does, though, suggest that our 
baseline result is sensitive to the time period used in the estimation and, as such, should 
                                                 
51
 In order to better control for macroeconomic factors, we also estimate the model controlling for: (1) 
percentage changes in population; (2) percentage changes in exchange rates between the yen and the 
dollar; (3) percentage changes in the GDP; and (4) percentage changes in the spot price of west Texas 
intermediate oil. We also include all of these new controls squared (for a total of 8 additional 
macroeconomic controls). While 7(4) of these 8 controls load significantly in the median (OLS) regression, 
they make only moderate improvements to the R-squared, and they do not materially change the 
coefficient on Treatment. 
52
 In another related test, we regressed the changes in the difference between book income and estimated 
taxable income (the book-tax difference, or BTD) on the variables in the baseline model. This variable is a 
measure of both tax avoidance and financial reporting quality, and large BTDs are interpreted as 
suggesting either aggressive tax planning, aggressive financial statement reporting practices, or both 
(Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Regressing differenced BTDs on our treatment variable and 
controls yields a negative and significant coefficient on Treatment. This is inconsistent with increased tax 
avoidance following the abolition of the disclosure regime. 
53
 Absent some structural shift in the Japanese economy, there is little reason to believe that discarding 
usable data and limiting our sample to only two years is the best sample selection procedure. Further, 
limiting our time series would not allow the estimation to take into account the true time-series variation in 
corporate taxable income. 
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be interpreted with caution.  
Our failure to find evidence that the abolition of disclosure leads to decreased taxable 
income for large public corporations could result from the limitation of our data (public 
firms only), from our identification strategy, or both. However, why abolishing disclosure 
might be associated with an increase in reported taxable income, as the regression 
results from Table II.3 suggest, is more difficult to explain. 
D. Analysis of Both Public and Private Firm Data 
One limitation of studying the public firms in the Compustat Global data is that public 
firms are arguably the least likely to react to a change in the system of public disclosure, 
given the widespread availability of financial information on such firms. In this section, we 
analyze a proprietary micro-level firm data set from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of 
Japan, the “Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, which covers 
both public and private firms.”54 This allows us to study the behavior of firms which are 
not otherwise subject to a large amount of public financial disclosure outside of the tax 
disclosure system. This proprietary data set can be accessed only after a lengthy 
application processes, and can only be physically accessed at one location in Tokyo. 
Firms receive a survey from the Ministry of Finance which collects 133 data items about 
the firm, most of which come directly from financial statement data (not tax returns).55 
Our panel dataset from the MOF contains observations from 1993 to 2009, and contains 
180,049 observations representing 44,196 unique firms (the actual sample size varies 
based on our choice of dependent variable); 93.7 percent of these firms are private. One 
key detail of the survey procedure used to collect these data is that the frequency with 
which firms are subject to these surveys depends on the size of the firm — very large 
firms are required to respond to the survey annually, while smaller firms are subject to 
the survey on a random basis. This survey technique chosen by the MOF will affect our 
identification strategy, as will be explained later.  
                                                 
54
 We would have also liked to use these data to replicate our distributional analysis on the full distribution 
of taxpayers (i.e., including those below the threshold). This is not possible for two reasons. First, the MOF 
data are financial statement data, and thus lack an exact measure of taxable income, forcing us to 
estimate the taxable income of the firm. Distributional analysis requires a precise value for taxable income 
(a value of ¥39.999 million needs to be differentiated from a value of ¥40.000 million). Second, the MOF 
data are survey data, and an examination of the data suggests that firms often round their reported figures, 
yielding numbers that are not precise enough for fitting a distribution. 
55
 While response to these surveys is mandated by law, there is little effort put into verifying the accuracy 
of the responses, and penalties for responding incorrectly are apparently light. 
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We use this micro-level data to estimate the following regression 
(2) 
TIit = b0 + b1After  Disclosuret + b2After Disclosure*Privateit + b3Unemploymentt
+b4UnemploymentSquaredt + FirmFEi +YearFEt + After  Disclosure* IndustryFEit ,
 
where TIit denotes firm i’s taxable income in year t divided by asset in year t. We use the 
firm’s estimated taxable income, pretax income, and tax expense as three different 
proxies for taxable income. After Disclosure is one for the time after the end of the 
disclosure regime (based on the fiscal year end, November 2005) and After Disclosure * 
Private is one if the firm is private and the time period is after the end of the disclosure 
regime. 56 Unemployment is the average monthly unemployment rate, as defined by the 
OECD, in year t and UnemploymentSquared equals (Unemployment)2. After Disclosure * 
Industry FE is a vector of dummy variables indicating membership in a specific industry 
and the time after the end of the disclosure regime. 
The dependent variable in this regression, TI, is a proxy for the firm’s taxable income. 
Since we lack actual tax return data, we rely upon three different proxies for taxable 
income. We winsorize all of the three types of dependent variables. The dependent 
variable is not differenced, which is different from the dependent variable in Model 1, 
where the dependent variable is TIDiff (differenced taxable income). The reason for this 
change is that in the micro data available from the Ministry of Finance, smaller firms are 
not often surveyed every year. Thus, using a differenced dependent variable requires 
that firms have two years of consecutive data, which effectively eliminates many smaller 
firms from our sample. Because we believe that smaller, private firms are more likely to 
exhibit a behavioral response to the abolition of tax disclosure, we instead include firm 
fixed effects, a procedure that, like differencing, adjusts for firm-specific but 
time-invariant effects.57   
Our hypothesis deals with the behavioral response to the abolition of disclosure for 
                                                 
56
 A firm’s public/private status is not recorded in the MOF data. We make this determination based on 
merging the 2005 Shikiho list (a list of all publicly traded firms in Japan) with our dataset based on firm 
name. This classification is imperfect because the merge relies upon firm name (and not a unique identifier, 
which is not available in the MOF data), and because it characterizes public/private status as a firm fixed 
effect (relying upon the firm’s public/private status in 2005). Given that firms both go public and go private 
after having been public, public/private is not, in reality, a firm fixed effect. However, we see no reason why 
this would bias our results.  
57
 While we tabulate only un-differenced taxable income using these data, using differenced taxable 
income does not change the tenor of our findings. Clustering standard errors by firm also does not change 
our inference. 
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firm/years occurring after the end of the disclosure regime (as captured by After 
Disclosure), and we expect this response to be larger for private firms (as captured by 
After Disclosure*Private). This is because, by virtue of financial reporting to investors, we 
expect the difference in the overall level of public information available about private 
firms as a result of the end of disclosure to be much greater than the difference for public 
firms.  
Although macroeconomic trends certainly affect the firms’ taxable income, our 
identification strategy requires the assumption that such trends do not differentially 
impact public and private firms in similar industries (as controlled for using the After 
Disclosure * Industry FE variables). Thus, while relying only on the After Disclosure 
dummy variable to measure a response to the abolition of disclosure would falsely 
attribute decreasing taxable incomes due to the business cycle (for example), 
identification achieved using the differential response of public and private firms to 
abolition requires the assumption that, starting in the treatment year of 2005, general 
economic conditions impact public and private firms similarly. While this is arguably less 
of an extreme assumption than assuming that no unobserved macroeconomic trend 
affected taxable incomes after disclosure, it is nevertheless non-trivial. 
We estimate Model 2 using ordinary least squares, and tabulate the results in Table II.4. 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 use estimated taxable income, pre-tax income, and tax expense as 
proxies for the taxable income of the firm. The negative sign on After Disclosure 
suggests that, on average, firms did decrease their taxable incomes after the disclosure 
regime ended. However, the estimated coefficient on After Disclosure*Private, contrary 
to our expectation, is reliably positive across all three proxies for taxable income. This 
suggests that relative to public firms, private firms’ taxable incomes increased after 
disclosure.58 
To be sure, this micro level analysis has a number of limitations. Its strength relative to 
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 While inconsistent with our previous results, this finding would be consistent with private firms having 
substantial proprietary costs associated with tax disclosure. For example, if, absent disclosure, suppliers 
are no longer able to use information on the firm’s profitability in setting prices, we may expect income to 
rise after the end of disclosure for private firms. This result could also be viewed in combination with our 
first hypothesis, which suggests that some taxpayers (those just under the threshold avoiding disclosure) 
will increase their taxable income without disclosure. To examine this possibility, we estimated Model 2 
using the MOF data on a sample of firms that are well above the disclosure threshold (taxable income 
above 80 million yen). We find similar results as when using our full sample, suggesting that disclosure 
threshold effects do not explain our counterintuitive findings regarding our second hypothesis. 
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the public-firm-only analysis is that it involves smaller private firms that one might expect 
to have the most significant reaction to the abolition of disclosure. It also allows firms to 
take time to implement their tax avoidance technologies, as the identification strategy 
does not rely upon an immediate response. But, like the prior test, it is limited by its use 
of an estimate of taxable income instead of actual taxable income. In addition, it uses 
firm survey data that have not been independently verified or tested. As a result, our 
inability to find evidence that disclosure resulted in improved compliance should not be 
considered a closed question but rather one that future research should address.59  
 
6. Conclusions 
Public disclosure of tax return information is one weapon in the arsenal of tax 
enforcement policy instruments, one that has been employed historically, is currently in 
use in several countries, and one that, for corporate returns, has recently been debated 
in the United States. The potential behavioral response to public disclosure of income tax 
returns figures prominently in policy debates about its advisability. Strikingly, all debates 
proceed in the near-complete absence of empirical evidence about the effects of public 
disclosure on behavior. This paper provides what, to our knowledge, is the first empirical 
evidence about the behavioral response to a tax return public notification system. Our 
analysis of data from the Japanese disclosure regime suggests that, when there is a 
threshold for disclosure, a non-trivial number of both individual and corporate taxpayers 
whose tax liability would otherwise be close to the threshold will under-report so as to 
avoid disclosure, provoking a response opposite to that stressed by supporters of 
disclosure. This suggests that some taxpayers perceive costs associated with disclosure, 
and they seek to avoid these costs by avoiding disclosure.  
However, our analysis of corporate taxpayers in Japan finds no consistent evidence that 
this cost associated with disclosure is related to the ability of public disclosure to restrain 
tax avoidance. We are unable to find consistent evidence that firms decreased their 
taxable income after the abolition of tax disclosure. This suggests that other costs, such 
                                                 
59
 As in our prior test using public firm data, we perform a variety of sensitivity tests where we alter the 
model estimated, the estimation technique, and the variable calculation procedures. None of our analyses 
provides consistent support for our hypothesis that the abolition of disclosure resulted in firms decreasing 
their taxable incomes. 
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as proprietary costs (which, unlike tax related costs, are increasing in profitability), may 
be the reason that firms near the threshold took action to get below the disclosure 
threshold. 
These findings will be useful to policymakers in considering enactment of a disclosure 
policy and designing a specific disclosure policy. For example, our findings suggest that 
non-universal disclosure will trigger avoidance behavior. If the level of taxable income or 
tax liability determines whether a taxpayer is subject to disclosure, as it did in Japan, the 
result can be a perverse revenue effect, as some taxpayers will manipulate their reported 
taxable income downward, decreasing revenues. If, as was proposed in H.R. 1556 in the 
United States in 2003, the disclosure system only applies to public firms, then, as Lenter, 
Shackelford, and Slemrod (2003, p. 826) suggest, some firms “might choose to withdraw 
from the public capital markets, rather than release their tax information.”60  In short, 
policy makers need to carefully consider the basis for requiring disclosure, and try to 
anticipate the consequences resulting from taxpayers trying to avoid disclosure. 
There are, to be sure, caveats to generalizing our results. Our strong result applies only 
to disclosure systems where not all taxpayers must disclose. The behavioral response 
will also depend on the social stigma or reward from a public disclosure of high taxable 
income, which arguably varies across countries and cultures. Specifically, results from 
our study in Japan may not be applicable in other countries, where taxpayers’ incentives 
to make public their private information may be different, where the elasticity of taxable 
income may be different, or where tax “morale” or norms about tax compliance may be 
different.61 Nevertheless, this research does establish with some degree of confidence 
                                                 
60
 Another recent example of taxpayers’ efforts to escape increased disclosure (albeit not public 
disclosure) involves Schedule M-3 in the United States. This new corporate income tax schedule, which 
requires a reconciliation between book and tax income and has the potential to allow the IRS to more 
efficiently audit companies, is required of all firms above a certain asset threshold that file Form 1120 and 
keep financial statements based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Dennis-Escoffier 
(2004) suggests that closely-held firms should consider escaping disclosure by simply ceasing to prepare 
GAAP financial statements; companies near the margin might also manipulate assets to stay below the 
asset threshold. Hasseldine et al. (2007) shows that increased perceptions of enforcement may encourage 
taxpayers to submit to increased disclosure requirements, suggesting that taxpayers’ willingness to 
disclose is also a function of tax authority enforcement. 
61
 Using survey data on tax compliance compiled by the World Economic Forum, La Porta et al. (1999) 
report a tax compliance index for Japan of 4.41, and for the United States of 4.47. In a sample with 49 
countries with a standard deviation of 1.002, this difference is not statistically significant. However, Torgler 
(2004) reports that Asian countries, and Japan in particular, generally have higher tax morale than do other 
OECD countries. He measures tax morale in terms of the willingness of survey participants to justify 
cheating on their taxes. Thus, while there may not be material differences in tax compliance in Japan and 
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that public disclosure will change behavior, sometimes in unintended ways, as most tax 
policy instruments do. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
other OECD countries, the Japanese may be less willing to justify what cheating does go on.  
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Figures 
 
Figure II.1 
Comparing the Actual to Fitted Distribution of Individual Taxable Income Using All 
Returns, Tax Year 2003 
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Figure II.2 
Comparing the Actual and Fitted Distribution of Individual Taxable Income Using Only 
“Unmanipulated” Returns, Tax Year 2003 
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Figure II.3 
Comparing the Actual to Fitted Distribution of Corporate Taxable Income Using All 
Returns, Calendar Year 2005 
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Figure II.4 
Comparing the Actual to Counterfactual Distribution of Corporate Taxable Income Using 
Only “Unmanipulated” Returns, Calendar Year 2005 
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Figure II.5 
Mean and Median TIDiff, by Fiscal Year End, June, 1992 to February, 2010 
  
Notes: This graph displays the mean and median differenced taxable 
income (TIDiff) from 1993 to 2010 for all Japanese firms available on 
Compustat Global that meet our sample selection criteria. The vertical line 
near November, 2005, represents the last fiscal year end date for firms 
which could reasonable have been assumed to be subject to the corporate 
tax disclosure regime. 
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Figure II.6 
Mean and Median TIDiff, by Fiscal Year End, May, 2005 to April, 2007 
  
Notes: This graph displays the mean and median differenced taxable 
income (TIDiff) from May, 2005 to April, 2007 for all Japanese firms 
available on Compustat Global that meet our sample selection criteria. 
The vertical line near November, 2005, represents the last fiscal year 
end date for firms which could reasonable have been assumed to be 
subject to the corporate tax disclosure regime. 
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Tables 
 
Table II.1 
Details of the Japanese Tax Notification System, Tax Years 1950–2004 
 
Panel A. Individual Tax Notification System, Tax Years 1950–2004 
Tax Year Range of 
Notification 
Approximate Number 
of Taxpayers Subject to 
Notification 
Percentage of 
Taxpayers 
Subject to 
Notification 
1950–1951 Taxable Income 
>500,000 yen 
90,000–150,000 2.1–4.3 
1952–1956 Taxable Income 
>1,000,000 yen 
30,000–70,000 1.2–3.2 
1957–1962 Taxable Income 
>2,000,000 yen 
20,000–150,000 1.1–6.3 
1963–1969 Taxable Income 
>5,000,000 yen 
30,000–170,000 1.2–3.9 
1970–1982 Taxable Income 
>10,000,000 yen 
80,000–440,000 1.7–6.7 
1983–2004 Tax Liability 
>10,000,000 yen 
(taxable income ~ 
34,000,000) 
70,000–180,000 0.9–2.0 
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Panel B. Corporate Tax Notification System, Tax Years 1950–2004 
Tax Year Range of 
Notification 
Approximate Total 
Number of 
Corporations 
Approximate 
Number of 
Corporations  
Subject to 
Notification 
1950–1951 Taxable Income 
>2,000,000 yen 
208,000–239,000  
1952–1956 Taxable Income 
>4,000,000 yen 
269,000–424,000  
1957–1969 Taxable Income 
>20,000,000 yen 
449,000–952,000  
1970–2004 Taxable Income 
>40,000,000 yen 
1,000,000–2,915,000 69,000–84,000 
Note: As a rough approximation, the yen-dollar exchange rate averaged about 
360 from 1950 until 1971, 290 from 1972 to 1977, 230 from 1978 to 1985, 140 
from 1986 to 1992, and 110 from 1993 to 2005. These data are from Tax 
Advisory Commission (2005). The data needed to estimate the approximate 
number of corporations subject to notification are only available for 1996, 
1999–2003 and 2005. 
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Table II.2 
Summary of Findings for Individual Income Tax: Alternative Methodologies for 
the Tax Years 2001, 2002, and 2003 
Tax Year Based on All Returns Based on “Unmanipulated” 
Returns 
 Estimated 
Pareto 
Parameter 
Estimated 
Number of 
Missing Returns 
Estimated 
Pareto 
Parameter 
Estimated 
Number of 
Missing Returns 
2001 2.2500 982 2.2986 1418 
2002 2.2461 754 2.2834 1065 
2003 2.2129 870 2.2557 1221 
Note: This table documents the estimated Pareto parameter obtained when 
fitting the disclosure data to a Pareto distribution, and the resulting number of 
missing returns estimated when using that Pareto parameter. This analysis is 
done using all the data available (Based on All Returns), and only using 
returns that are sufficiently above the threshold that they are likely not 
manipulated (Based on “Unmanipulated” Returns), for the years 2001, 2002, 
and 2003.    
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Table II.3 
Public Corporation Response to the Abolition of Tax Disclosure 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
Observatio
ns 
Mea
n 
Standar
d 
Deviatio
n 
25th 
Percentil
e 
Media
n 
75th 
Percentil
e 
TIDiff 59,667 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0 0.01 
Treatment 59,667 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 
UnemDiff 59,667 0.11 0.36 -0.26 0.13 0.32 
UnemDiffS
q 
59,667 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.16 
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Panel B. Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: TIDiff 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient         
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient         
(t-statistic) 
 
(1) (2) 
Treatment 0.00298*** 0.00592*** 
 
(18.41) (6.46) 
UnemDiff  –0.00284*** –0.00997** 
 
(–20.73) (–2.49) 
UnemDiffSq 0.00224*** 0.00830 
 
(9.23) (1.56) 
Constant –0.00011 0.00106 
 
(–0.25) (1.60) 
   Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quantile Regression Yes No 
   
   Observations  59,667   59,667  
R-squared 0.0048 0.035 
 
Notes: The dependent variable, TIDiff, is the firm's estimated 
taxable income less the firm's estimated taxable income in the prior 
year, scaled by prior year's assets. Treatment is one if the firm was 
subject to disclosure in year t–1 but not in year t, and zero 
otherwise. UnemDiff is the average monthly unemployment rate, 
as defined by the OECD, in year t minus the average monthly 
unemployment rate in year t–1. UnemDiffSq is the squared value 
of UnemDiff. Industry Fixed Effects are defined by two-digit SIC 
codes. The t-statistics for the OLS regression (included in 
parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered by 
fiscal year end month, and year. Asterisks denote two-tailed 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  
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Table II.4 
Public and Private Corporation Response to the Abolition of Tax Disclosure 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Obser- 
vations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Estimated Taxable Income 180,049 0.040 0.053 0.003 0.021 0.056 
Pre-tax Income 153,896 0.050 0.056 0.013 0.032 0.066 
Tax Expense 180,049 0.017 0.022 0.001 0.009 0.024 
After Disclosure 202,858 0.268 0.443 0 0 1 
After Disclosure * Private 202,858 0.217 0.412 0 0 0 
Unemployment 202,858 4.176 0.832 3.389 4.3 4.8 
Unemployment Squared 202,858 18.131 6.684 11.485 18.49 23.040 
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Panel B. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable 
Estimated 
Taxable 
Income 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax Expense 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
After Disclosure –0.03413*** –0.01478 –0.01404*** 
 (–3.89) (–1.37) (–3.75) 
After Disclosure * Private 0.00668*** 0.00337*** 0.00289*** 
 (12.58) (5.54) (12.73) 
Unemployment –0.00347 0.00468 0.00115 
 (–0.65) (0.77) (0.50) 
Unemployment Squared 0.00050 –0.00040 –0.00009 
 (0.84) (–0.58) (–0.36) 
Constant 0.04332*** 0.03856*** 0.01644*** 
 (4.55) (3.56) (4.04) 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
After Disclosure * Industry Fixed 
Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 180,049 153,896 180,049 
R-squared 0.025 0.024 0.019 
 
Notes: The dependent variables, Estimated Taxable Income, Pre-Tax Income and 
Tax Expense, are three different proxies for the firms’ taxable income, and are all 
scaled by assets. The value of After Disclosure is one for the time after the end of 
the disclosure regime. The value of After Disclosure * Private is one if the firm is 
private and for the time after the end of the disclosure regime. Unemployment is 
the average monthly unemployment rate for Japan, as defined by the OECD, in 
year t. Unemployment Squared is the squared value of Unemployment. Asterisks 
denote two-tailed significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels, 
calculated using standard errors after including firm fixed effects.  Clustering by 
firm does not change our inference. 
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Chapter III 
Determinants of Charitable Giving to 
Unexpected Natural Disasters: Evidence from 
Two Major Earthquakes in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
Two disastrous earthquakes which happened in Japan, specifically the 2011 
Tohoku Earthquake and the 1995 Hanshin Earthquake, are still fresh in our 
minds. The respective death tolls were 13,135 and 6,402, and the respective 
economic losses were $20.7 billion and $9.62 billion62. Figure III.1 is a map of 
Japan showing the epicenters. 
However, it was truly inspiring that many charity events and volunteer activities 
were held, and a great amount of donations were collected after these 
earthquakes. As shown in Figure III.2, quite a few people in Japan worked as 
volunteers after the Tohoku Earthquake. In terms of donations, the focus of this 
study, great amounts of donations were collected in Japan just after the 
earthquakes (Figure III.3), and almost half of the private donations in Japan in 
2011 were for the Tohoku Earthquake. Figure III.4 shows that the increase in 
donation results, from both the effect along the external margin (increase in the 
                                                 
62
 The death toll and economic loss are cited from a website of Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan 
(http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/2b_sanko_siryo_06.h
tm , http://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/cr/cr11/pdf/chr11_zu2-2.pdf). Exchange rate is obtained from a 
website of Bank of Japan. 
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rate of donors) and the effect along the internal margin (increase in the 
average amount donation among donors). Then, one can come up with natural 
questions: who donated to the earthquake victims, and what factors are 
associated with donors making donations? So far, few studies have been done 
on the donations for these earthquakes and no study, as far as can be 
determined, has answered these questions. 
These questions are not only avocational, but also of policy interest. In many 
countries, it is considered that private donations should be enhanced, since a 
lot of governments already incur enormous amounts of debt. Taxable 
deductions for certain charitable donations are the examples. An extreme 
example is the tax credit for private donations in Hungary. Hungarian policy 
admits tax credits for private donations up to one percent of the individual’s tax 
liability. The reason why Hungary adopted such a policy is that Hungary 
needed a policy to finance charitable institutions without increasing 
government expenditure (Bauer, 2004). In Japan, the Cabinet Office of the 
Japanese Government advocated the importance of private donations, and 
proposed a policy to increase private donations. This sort of policy is named 
“New Public” 63 . The characteristics of individuals who made charitable 
donations, especially after the big earthquakes, should be investigated as a 
basic data for such a policy. However, such characteristics have not been 
investigated in detail. 
In order to answer the questions “who donated to the earthquake victims, and 
what factors are associated with donors making donations?” we analyzed 
micro-level household data sets provided from the Statistics Bureau, Ministry 
                                                 
63
 “New Public” is explained in the website of the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 
(http://www5.cao.go.jp/npc/pdf/torikumi0906.pdf). 
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of Internal Affair and Communications’ “Family Income and Expenditure 
Survey” (FIES hereafter). FIES contains monthly panel consumption data of 
households, including data of private donations, as well as demographic 
features of households such as number of household members, age of the 
head of household, and savings. About 9,000 households are requested to 
record their income and expenditure in the Family Account Book every month. 
This statistic started in 1946 and such a large, detailed and high frequency 
data is unique to Japan
64
. 
Historically, the economics of charitable donation has attracted the interest of 
many economists. In the United States in particular, enormous amounts of 
donations have been made, but it is difficult to explain the behavior of donation 
theoretically. The theoretical framework of economy explains human behavior 
with self-interest, while the behavior of donating seems to be completely 
unselfish. To take an example from the United States, the amount of donations 
is $316.23 billion in 201265, 2% of GDP. Among these previous studies, most 
studies especially focus on private donations66. This paper hereafter focuses 
on private donations, also.  
There are some threads of previous studies focusing on private donations. 
Since our study is about the determinants for charitable donations, it is natural 
to introduce previous studies about the determinants for charitable donations 
first. Hood et al. (1977), Kitchen (1992), Tiehen (2001), Auten et al. (2002) and 
Bakija and Heim (2011) pointed out the relationship between income and 
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 Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Government of Japan 
compares FIES made in G7 countries in its website 
(http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kakei/pdf/mikata7.pdf) and concludes that the Japanese FIES is the 
most frequent (monthly) and that only four of G7 countries, including Japan, require 
households to keep their Family Account Books. Among such four countries, it concludes that 
Japan surveys the largest number of households (approximately 9,000 households). 
65
 Giving USA 2012 
66
 In USA, 72% of the donation is contributed by individuals. 
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donation. Wealth was found to have positive association with donation by 
Kitchen (1992). Although income and wealth monotonically associate with 
donation, association by age is not that simple. Glenday et al. (1986) and 
Kitchen (1992) showed that age has a monotonically positive association with 
donations, where Gittell and Tebaldi (2006) explained the association is 
U-shaped; i.e., middle-aged people between ages 35 to 54 donate the least. 
Tiehen (2001), Gittell and Tabaldi (2006) and Schokkaert (2006) showed that 
education has a positive association with donation. Religious affiliation also 
has a positive association (Jackson et al., 1995; Gittell and Tabaldi, 2006). 
Since tax incentives, which definitely enhance charitable donations, have been 
studied especially intensively, we introduce these works in a separate 
paragraph. The effect of government grants, which has also been studied 
thoroughly, is introduced in the following paragraph. 
As explained in the previous paragraph, tax incentives to enhance charitable 
donations are studied often. One reason why it has been studied is that this is 
one of the most important measures for government. Feldstein and Clotfelter 
(1976) estimated  price elasticity with respect to private donations. Randolph 
(1995) estimated both permanent and transitory elasticity. Auten et al. (2002) 
estimated such elasticity based on a permanent income hypothesis. Although 
there are relatively fewer studies about Japan, Yamauchi (1997) estimated 
price elasticity with respect to private donations in Japan. Feldstein (1980) 
showed theoretically that tax deductibility is more efficient than government 
direct expenditure for public goods.  
Government grants are other important measures for government. Therefore, 
the effect of government grants on charitable donations has been studied 
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thoroughly. For example, Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) showed theoretically 
that government direct expenditure to a public good financed by lump-sum 
taxes completely cancels out private donations. Bergstrom et al. (1986) 
extended their model by introducing non-donors; Bernheim (1986) extended 
their model by introducing multiple public goods; and Andreoni (1988) 
extended their model to a natural limit. Payne (1998) finds an incomplete 
crowding-out effect by using non-profit firm data. Gruber and Hungerman 
(2007) explained how government spending under the New Deal crowded out 
church spending. Andreoni and Payne (2011) found that the main reason of 
the crowding-out is the reduced fundraising effort. 
Since the commencement of experimental economics in 1948 (Chamberlin, 
1948), experiments have been used to explain people’s non-rational 
decision-making. Since donating is prima facie non-rational behavior, 
experiments have been carried out to analyze human behavior. Among these 
experimental studies, Eckel et al. (2007) share some research interest with us, 
because they conducted laboratory experiments after Hurricane Katrina to 
observe how private donations for Katrina victims was affected by the initial 
endowment, matching subsidy rate and place. These factors are not identical 
but are somewhat related to wealth, price, and distance. There are other 
experimental studies. For example, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) used 
solicitation by direct mail to see how such efforts enhance charitable donations. 
Eckel and Grossman (2003) created rebate subsidies for some donors and 
matching subsidies for others, and tested the equivalency between them. 
Karlan and List (2007) and Meier (2007) investigated how matching subsidies 
enhances charitable donations. Eckel and Grossman (2008) investigated the 
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difference between men and women in Public Goods, Ultimatum, and Dictator 
Experiments.  
Finally, Andreoni (2006) provided a great survey on these studies. 
These previous works focus on time-homogeneous charitable donations, and 
most of them disregard a sudden increase in donations following an 
unexpected event such as natural disasters. One example of research on such 
increases in donations is Brown et al. (2012), who studied the determinants of 
charitable donations in the United States for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
disaster. They studied the determinants of increases in charitable donations to 
unexpected natural disasters, and found that a household that already had 
donated for other purposes tended to donate more for tsunami victims than a 
household that had not donated previously. Additionally, age was not found to 
be a significant explanatory variable for tsunami donations whereas it had a 
positive association with all other charitable donations. In addition, they found 
that some determinants are associated with both tsunami donations and all 
other donations; such as households with a female breadwinner, education, 
and religion.  
In the study of Brown et al. (2012), they used biennial panel data, and their 
study was on donations from US citizens for a natural disaster which 
happened far away from the United States. In our study, we observe donations 
just before and after natural disasters using monthly data; we study the data 
from two natural disasters; and we study the charitable donations for natural 
disasters which occurred within the country. For this purpose, FIES data is best 
suited for analyzing charitable donations for natural disasters.  
There is a reason for us to analyze a natural disaster which happened within 
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the country. We can investigate whether “distance” from the epicenter of the 
disaster affected private donations, which may be hardly observed if the 
natural disaster had occurred outside the country. There is also another reason 
why we consider “distance” as an important factor. Kimball et al. (2006) found 
that geographical distance affected  unhappiness after Hurricane Katrina. 
Ishino et al. (2011) pointed out the relationship between donations and 
happiness after the Tohoku Earthquake. Therefore, it is natural to consider 
“distance” as a determinant in the analysis; that is, the distance between the 
residence of donors and the epicenter of the disaster. If distance matters, it is 
the evidence that geographical distance affects not only happiness but also 
behavioral response of the donors. One of our novelties is that we investigate 
whether distance is associated with donations after natural disasters, and 
reinforce the result by analyzing two donations after two earthquakes. 
There is actually a study which has an interest in the association of distance in 
the context of donation after natural disaster. The laboratory experiment by 
Eckel et al. (2007) investigated what kind of factors, such as initial endowment, 
matching subsidy rate, and location, affected private donations after Hurricane 
Katrina. One location was Texas, which was affected more by Hurricane 
Katrina than another location, Minnesota. We recognize that their study also 
reveals the determinants of charitable donations for victims of natural disasters, 
including distance. However, since their study used laboratory experiments 
whereas ours uses actual data of donations, there are substantial differences 
between their study and ours. 
This paper proceeds in five parts. The next section explains FIES data in detail. 
The following two sections analyze data from the Tohoku Earthquake and 
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Hanshin Earthquake respectively. Then, the following section summarizes the 
result and the last section will be the conclusion. 
 
2. Data Description 
The scope of the survey of FIES is all households in Japan, excluding some 
households such as single-person student households. Using the three-stage 
stratified sampling method, 8,076 households of two or more people, as well 
as 745 single-person households, were requested to report their consumption 
every month. Households of two or more people were surveyed in six 
consecutive months, whereas single-person households were surveyed in 
three consecutive months. One-sixth of the households of two or more people 
were replaced every month, whereas one-third of the single-person 
households were replaced every month. 
Each household was requested to report their Household Schedule, Family 
Account Book, Yearly Income Schedule, and Savings Schedule. Household 
Schedule includes non-monetary statistics, such as number of household 
members or gender of the head of household. Yearly Income Schedule and 
Savings Schedule included annual income, savings, and loans, which are 
available from 2002. Family Account Book included monthly consumption data 
divided into approximately 600 types of consumptions, including donations. 
Household Schedule, Yearly Income Schedule, and Savings Schedule were 
reported only once per household, and the Family Account Book is reported 
every month. Demographic features of each household were extracted from 
Household Schedule, Yearly Income Schedule and Savings Schedule. 
The micro-level household data of FIES can be accessed at a single location in 
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Tokyo, Japan after an application process. In order to create panel data from 
the micro-level household data, we follow the method written in Unayama 
(2011)67. 
We used the monthly donation amount as a dependent variable, and we used 
the demographic features of households (age of the head of household, 
income, gender of the head of household, number of household members, 
workrate68, geographical distance from disaster epicenter 69, savings, and 
loans) as independent variables. A dummy variable “pre-donation”70 as added 
to identify households that donated before the month of the earthquake.  
The following variables are not included in FIES, and thus were not included in 
our analysis: religion, ethnicity71, or years of education72. Also, a variable of 
“price” (= ‘1- marginal tax rate’ if itemized and 1 otherwise) was not included in 
our analysis. If one donates a unit amount to a certain charity, her disposable 
income falls by ‘1- marginal tax rate’ if she itemizes, because her tax liability 
falls due to the ‘marginal tax rate’. Thus, many previous studies included “price” 
as one of the independent variables. However, we considered “price” to be 
less important in our study. The main reason why "price" is less important in 
Japan is that fewer people itemize deductions. In actuality, only 10-20% of 
                                                 
67
 The author thanks Takashi Unayama for providing the author with Stata code to create 
panel data from FIES micro-level data. 
68
 Workrate is defined as the number of workers in household divided by the number of 
household member. 
69
 “Geographical distance” is calculated as the distance from the affected area to the donor’s 
location. Affected area is Iwate Prefecture, Miyagi Prefecture and Fukushima Prefecture in the 
Tohoku Earthquake; and Osaka Prefecture and Hyogo Prefecture in the Hanshin Earthquake. 
When calculating geographical distance from the affected area to the donor’s location, we 
calculate the distance from the prefectural capital in which the donor lives, to the prefectural 
capital of each affected area, and take the minimum value of these. Finally, we drop 
observations whose value of geographical distance equals zero. 
70
 pre-donation=1 if a household donated before the month of the earthquake and 
pre-donation=0 otherwise. 
71
 Taking into account the fact that Japan is relatively homogeneous in terms of religion and 
ethnicity, we consider that such data is not crucial in our study. 
72
 In FIES, education data is not available except for people who are currently studying in 
educational institutions. 
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donations enjoy tax deductions in Japan whereas more than 32%73 in the 
United States (Cordes et al., 2000; Friedman and Greenstein, 2002; Kato, 
2010). Also, FIES does not have data of the marginal tax rate. FIES includes 
household income statistics. However, since Japanese progressive income tax 
is imposed on personal incomes, not on household incomes, we have no idea 
about the marginal tax rate that each household faces. In addition, FIES does 
not have information about whether a household itemizes its donation or not.  
We used the six months panel data from two months preceding the month of 
the earthquake, to three months after the month of the earthquake; where the 
earthquake happened in March 2011 in Tohoku, or January 1995 in Hanshin. 
The summary statistics of the FIES data is shown in Table III.1 and Table III.2. 
We can observe great increases in donations in the month the earthquakes 
happened and in the following month. In addition, we can easily see that 
households which had donated before the month of the earthquake donated 
for earthquake victims with a higher probability. 
We define the terms in Table III.3 for convenience. 
The natural logarithm74 was taken hereafter to donations, income, savings, 
loans, and distance data75. Figure III.5 represents the distribution of the natural 
logarithm of donations on March 2011, the month the Tohoku Earthquake 
occurred. 73.3% people took zero in the histogram. The average donation is 
1,993 yen whereas it is 7,465 yen among donors. The right histogram of Figure 
                                                 
73
 32% of taxpayers used itemized deduction in the United States. Since higher income 
taxpayers tend to itemize deduction more and higher income people tend to donate more, it is 
probable that much more than 32% of donations enjoy tax deductions. With this background, 
price elasticity has attracted great deal of attention in the studies in the United States, and 
some studies (e.g. Brown et al., 2012) use "price" as an explanatory variable. 
74
 Following e.g. Brown et al. (2012) 
75
 Natural logarithm of zero is recorded to zero. Since there is no value between zero and one 
among these nor are there any negative values, any natural logarithm takes zero or positive 
value. 
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III.5 explains one of the reasons why we take the natural logarithm for donation 
statistics. The histogram of donation statistics would be positively skewed if the 
natural logarithm were not taken. 
Next, we analyzed what factors are associated with pre-earthquake donations 
and earthquake donations. Since the dependent variable, donations, takes 
numerous zeros and the dependent variable must be non-negative, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression does not perform accurately. 
Instead of OLS regression, we used the Tobit regression to fix this issue. We 
explain the Tobit regression as follows. 
Let * ,itprey  be the latent propensity to donate in month t  of household i  in 
the pre-earthquake period. We assume that the latent propensity, whose 
domain is ),(  , depends linearly on independent variables: 
itprettpreipreitpre udummyxy ,,
*
,                                (1) 
where ix  is a vector of demographic features of household i , tdummy  is a 
dummy variable for month t , itpreu ,  is a normally distributed random variable, 
and pre  and tpre,  are coefficients. We further assume that if the latent 
propensity to donate is positive, the observed donation is equal to the latent 
propensity to donate ( * ,, itpreitpre yy  ), and otherwise the observed donation is 
zero ( 0, itprey ). 
In the post-earthquake period, our hypothesis was that there is a positive 
association between pre-earthquake donations and post-earthquake 
donations. This viewpoint is related to the study by Brown et al. (2012), which 
showed the positive association between planned philanthropy and unplanned 
giving for the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. Thus, the latent propensity to 
donate is expressed as: 
Peak: including 1,000 yen 
donation 
Peak: including 
10,000 yen 
donation 
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itpreittpostipostitpost upredonatedummyxy ,,
*
,                  (2) 
where the dummy variable ipredonate  takes unity ( 1ipredonate ) if 
household i  donated in the pre-earthquake period and takes zero 
( 0ipredonate ) otherwise. 
These above regressions are Tobit regressions 76  (Tobin, 1958). This 
regression performs well if the dependent variable is restricted to a 
non-negative number which frequently takes zero. 
In order to investigate the differences in the post-earthquake period between 
households that donated in the pre-earthquake period and households that did 
not, we conducted a Tobit regression in the post-earthquake period, restricted 
to households that donated in the pre-earthquake period on one hand and 
restricted to households that did not on the other hand. On these regressions, 
we express the latent propensity to donate as follows: 
itpredonatettpredonateipredonateitpredonate udummyxy ,,
*
,                    (3) 
for households that donated in the pre-earthquake period, and 
ittenonpredonatttenonpredonaitenonpredonaittenonpredona udummyxy ,,
*
,              (4) 
for households that did not donate in the pre-earthquake period. 
Our hypothesis of the signal condition on Tobit regressions on pre-earthquake 
donations and in earthquake donations is shown in Table III.4. Our hypothesis 
on gender, age, income, and savings follows previous studies. Our hypothesis 
on age’s association with earthquake donations follows Brown et al. (2012), 
which showed that age has no association with tsunami donation. Our 
hypothesis on distance follows our intuition that sympathy, which may 
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 Following e.g. Brown et al. (2012) 
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decrease with distance, is positively correlated with earthquake donations.    
 
3. An Analysis of Tohoku Earthquake in 2011 
We conducted a Tobit analysis in the pre-earthquake period and the 
post-earthquake period. The result is shown in Table III.5. 
There are three findings which correlated with previous studies. The most 
significant finding was that the dummy variable "pre-donation" has a positive 
association with earthquake donations. This fact shows that households that 
donated before the earthquake tended to donate more for the earthquake 
victims. This finding meets the result of Brown et al. (2012), which showed that 
households that had donated before the tsunami disaster tended to donate 
more for tsunami victims. Another finding is that there is a clear evidence of 
sudden increases in the amount of donations which sharply declines in the 
course of time. The other finding was that income, savings, and age are 
positively associated with both earthquake donations and pre-earthquake 
donations, which is intuitively plausible. These three findings are consistent 
with previous studies. 
Age’s association with donations in the post-earthquake period differs from our 
hypothesis. This age’s association is further studied in Table III.6. 
It is of importance to discuss how distance is associated with donations. A 
positive and significant relationship between distance and donations in the 
pre-earthquake period is observed. The reason is unknown. There may be 
some correlation between private donations and geographical conditions. 
However, in the post-earthquake period, earthquake donations beat out the 
inherent positive relationship and produced the opposite, negative, and 
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significant relationship. This can be evidence that earthquake donations are 
likely to be a function of geographical distance with a negative coefficient. This 
may be evidence that sympathy, which positively associates with donations, is 
negatively correlated with geographical distance77. 
We also conducted a Tobit analysis, restricting to households that donated in 
the pre-earthquake period and restricting to households that did not donate in 
the pre-earthquake period, respectively. The result is shown in Table III.6. 
There were two findings worth mentioning. FIES data shows that the amount 
of donations peaked in March 2011, and declined sharply during the 
post-earthquake period. For donations from those who donated in the 
pre-earthquake period, however, a significant downward trend with the amount 
of donation was not observed. For sympathetic individuals (who donated in the 
pre-earthquake period), sympathy for the earthquake victims might last longer. 
Additionally, positive association between age and earthquake donations was 
observed for households that did not donate in the pre-earthquake period, 
whereas it was not observed for households that did donate in the 
pre-earthquake period. Previous studies already showed that age has a 
smaller association with disaster-related donations, and our contribution is a 
further analysis on two kinds of households: households that donated in the 
pre-earthquake period and households that did not.  
 
4. An Analysis of the Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 
We studied the analysis on the Tohoku Earthquake. By sheer coincidence, we 
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 People may think that people in Osaka and Hyogo prefectures donated more for Tohoku 
Earthquake victims because they had suffered from the Hanshin Earthquake. However, we 
could not find such evidence. 
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can conduct a similar analysis on the Hanshin Earthquake. We conducted a 
Tobit analysis in the pre-earthquake period and the post-earthquake period for 
the Hanshin Earthquake. The result is shown in Table III.7. 
Several findings in Hanshin Earthquake obtained from Table III.7 are similar to 
those in Tohoku Earthquake. The dummy variable "pre-donation" has a 
positive association with earthquake donations. As we saw in the Tohoku 
Earthquake case, this fact also shows that households that donated before the 
earthquake tended to donate more for earthquake victims. Moreover, there is a 
clear evidence of a sudden increase in donations that sharply declines in the 
course of time. In addition, income, savings, and age are positively associated 
with earthquake donations and pre-earthquake donations. 
It is of importance to discuss how distance is associated with donations. 
Distance is not a significant explanatory variable in the pre-earthquake 
period 78 . However, distance becomes a significant variable in the 
post-earthquake period with a negative coefficient. Therefore, earthquake 
donations are likely to be a function of geographical distance with a negative 
coefficient. This finding coincides with our findings in the Tohoku Earthquake 
case. 
We also conducted a Tobit analysis by restricting to households that donated 
in the pre-earthquake period on one hand and by restricting to households that 
did not donate in the pre-earthquake period on the other hand. The result is 
shown in Table III.8. 
Two findings follow from Table III.8. The most important is that a positive 
association between age and earthquake donations was observed for 
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 Consistent with our hypothesis. Note that the epicenter is different between the Hanshin 
Earthquake and the Tohoku Earthquake. 
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households that did not donate in the pre-earthquake period, whereas it was 
not observed for other households. This finding corresponding to age is 
identical to that of the Tohoku Earthquake case. Additionally, we obtained a 
different result from the Tohoku Earthquake case: of households that donated 
in the pre-earthquake period, a significant downward trend in the amount of 
donations was observed after the earthquake.  
 
5. Result 
We found several determinants for a sudden upswing in donations following an 
unexpected event such as a natural disaster. Some determinants are 
consistent with previous studies, such as Brown et al. (2012). We found three 
determinants that do not deviate from previous studies. First, there is a strong 
and positive association between donations before the earthquake and 
earthquake donations. Second, income and savings are positively associated 
with earthquake donations and non-earthquake purpose donations. Third, age 
is positively associated with donations for non-earthquake purposes. These 
three findings do not detract from previous research. However, age also has a 
positive association with earthquake donations. This finding is somewhat 
different from previous studies. 
There are several new findings. Earthquake donations are likely to be a 
function of geographical distance from the epicenter with a negative coefficient. 
As far as can be determined, such dependence upon the distance from the 
disaster was first pointed out in our context79. This fact may indicate that 
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 As we have seen already, happiness studies (e.g. Kimball et al., 2006) and experiments 
(e.g. Eckel et al., 2007) are interested in the effect of distance. However, these studies are 
substantially different from our study in the context. 
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sympathy for earthquake victims is negatively associated with distance. This 
geographic distance result may indicate the possibility for reducing the tax 
burden by having some portion of one’s tax go to the local area one chooses80. 
The other finding is that we can observe a positive association between age 
and earthquake donations for households that did not donate in the 
pre-earthquake period, whereas we cannot for households that did. Such 
detailed analysis about the association between age and donation has not 
been determined before.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We conducted an event study on donations before and after disastrous 
earthquakes. We found significant determinants of private donations for 
victims of such natural disasters. Among the determinants, three facts are to 
be noted: 
(1) Past experience of donations was positively and significantly associated 
with earthquake donations;  
(2) Income, savings, and age has a positive association with earthquake 
donations as well as donations for other purposes; and  
(3) Earthquake donations are likely to be a function of geographical distance 
with a negative coefficient. 
However, the aforementioned relationship between age and donation 
disappears when it comes to households that had donated before the 
earthquakes.  
For policy perspectives, it is worth it to understand the trend of behaviors 
                                                 
80
 Such a policy was already implemented in Japan (Hometown tax payment, implemented in 
2008). 
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related to earthquake donations. Briefly, (1) sympathetic (those who once 
donated for other purposes), (2) rich (those with high income and savings) and 
(3) nearby (from the epicenter, in the case of earthquake) people tend to 
donate for the victims of such natural disasters. 
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Figures 
 
  
Figure III.1: Maps and epicenters of the Tohoku and Hanshin 
earthquakes81 
 
 
Figure III.2: Monthly number of volunteers for Tohoku Earthquake; i.e. 
volunteers in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures82 
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 Cited from the website of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 
Government of Japan 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpaa201101/detail/1311096.htm) and the 
website of Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 
(http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/kyokun/pdf/101.pdf).The author adds the epicenter of the 
Hanshin Earthquake on the map. 
82
 Data: National Institute of Educational Policy Research (2011) 
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Figure III.3: Monthly private donation per household before and after 
Tohoku and Hanshin earthquakes83  
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 Data: Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
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Figure III.4: Donation before/after Earthquakes 
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Figure III.5: The distribution of earthquake donation on March 2011 
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Tables 
 
Table III.1: Summary statistics for Jan-Jun 2011 and Nov 1994-Apr 1995 
Tohoku Earthquake Hanshin Earthquake 
obs. 1156 mean 
std. 
dev. 
min max obs. 1165 mean 
std. 
dev. 
min max 
donation 
Jan 2011 
203  3,211  0  100,000  
donation 
Nov 1994 
118  764  0  20,000  
donation 
Feb 2011 
189  3,115  0  100,000  
donation 
Dec 1994 
262  2,210  0  50,000  
donation 
Mar 2011 
1,993  8,275  0  100,000  
donation 
Jan 1995 
1,941  6,753  0  116,600  
donation 
Apr 2011 
1,589  16,264  0  400,000  
donation 
Feb 1995 
782  3,506  0  66,000  
donation 
May 2011 
258  1,249  0  20,500  
donation 
Mar 1995 
250  2,203  0  50,000  
donation 
Jun 2011 
214  1,258  0  21,000  
donation 
Apr 1995 
208  1,383  0  20,020  
age 57.0  15.1  22  95  age 50.0  13.6  22  90  
income 595  368  96  3,696  income 731  466  60  8,270  
gender 
(male:1 
female:2) 
1.09  0.29  1  2  
gender 
(male:1 
female:2) 
1.05  0.21  1  2  
# of 
household 
members 
3.00  1.09  2  8  
# of 
household 
members 
3.34  1.16  2  7  
workrate 0.42  0.32  0  1  workrate 0.46  0.29  0  1  
distance 
[km] 
546  380  45  1,756  
distance 
[km] 
404  271  29  1,184  
saving 1,247  1,877  0  23,683       
loan 395  1,002  0  14,350       
note: We excluded the data around the epicenter; i.e. data of distance=0. 
Thus, the minimum of the distance is larger than zero. 
unit: [yen] for donation and [10 thousand yen] for income, saving and loan 
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Table III.2: Summary statistics about donation in every month 
Tohoku Earthquake 
  All household 
Households that donated 
before the month of the 
earthquake (6.7% of all 
households) 
  
Average 
donation 
[yen] (A) 
Ration 
of 
donating 
househo
ld (B) 
A/B[ye
n] 
Average 
donation 
[yen] (C) 
Ration 
of 
donating 
househo
ld (D) 
C/D[ye
n] 
donation Jan 
2011 
203  3.7% 5,544        
donation Feb 
2011 
189  4.3% 4,388        
donation Mar 
2011 
1,993  26.7% 7,465  7,206  56.2% 12,831  
donation Apr 
2011 
1,589  22.2% 7,159  8,750  56.2% 15,579  
donation May 
2011 
258  15.2% 1,697  1,060  47.9% 2,211  
donation Jun 
2011 
214  9.8% 2,177  828  32.9% 2,517  
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Hanshin Earthquake 
  All household 
Households that donated 
before the month of the 
earthquake (21.6% of all 
households) 
  
Average 
donation 
[yen] (A) 
Ration 
of 
donating 
househo
ld (B) 
A/B[ye
n] 
Average 
donation 
[yen] (C) 
Ration 
of 
donating 
househo
ld (D) 
C/D[ye
n] 
donation Nov 
1994 
118  12.0% 985        
donation Dec 
1994 
262  11.5% 2,288        
donation Jan 
1995 
1,941  38.2% 5,076  3,433  59.8% 5,738  
donation Feb 
1995 
782  26.1% 2,992  1,231  39.3% 3,129  
donation Mar 
1995 
250  5.4% 4,629  682  11.3% 6,040  
donation Apr 
1995 
208  7.1% 2,917  354  12.6% 2,823  
 
 
Table III.3: Definition of terms 
Term Definition 
Pre-earthquake period months before the month of the earthquake 
Post-earthquake period The month of the earthquake and after 
Pre-earthquake donation84 donation in pre-earthquake period 
Earthquake donation85 donation in post-earthquake period 
 
 
  
                                                 
84
 The purpose of this donation is irrelevant to the earthquake. 
85
 It must be a mixture of donation for earthquake victims and other purpose donations. 
However, we look upon this donation as an earthquake-related donation. 
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Table III.4: Hypothesis of the signal condition 
Sign Condition pre-earthquake donation earthquake donation 
gender + + 
age + insignificant 
income + or insignificant + or insignificant 
saving + or insignificant + or insignificant 
loan ? ? 
# of household members ? ? 
workrate  ? ? 
distance insignificant - 
pre-donation  + 
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Table III.5: Tobit analysis in pre-earthquake period and post-earthquake 
period for Tohoku Earthquake 
Pre-earthquake donation  Post-earthquake donation 
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat.  
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat. 
gender -1.51  2.91  (-0.52)  gender 1.16  0.78  (1.48) 
age<20 (omitted)  age<20 (omitted) 
20age<30 -4.43  5.98  (-0.74)  20age<30 -4.00  1.65  (-2.42) 
30age<40 -2.39  2.67  (-0.89)  30age<40 -3.98  0.87  (-4.60) 
40age<50 -6.59  2.83  (-2.33)  40age<50 -1.69  0.74  (-2.28) 
50age<60 -0.93  2.08  (-0.45)  50age<60 -1.70  0.67  (-2.54) 
log(income) 8.56  1.88  (4.56)  log(income) 2.77  0.51  (5.41) 
log(saving) 0.57  0.27  (2.09)  log(saving) 0.41  0.08  (4.92) 
log(loan) 0.09  0.26  (0.36)  log(loan) -0.02  0.08  (-0.31) 
# of 
household 
members 
-2.12  0.88  (-2.40)  
# of 
household 
members 
-0.99  0.25 (-3.91) 
workrate -4.88  2.73  (-1.79)  workrate -1.70  0.80  (-2.12) 
log(distance) 2.99  1.09  (2.76)  log(distance) -0.65  0.30  (-2.19) 
dummy (Feb 
2011) 
1.01  1.45  (0.70)  
dummy 
(pre-donation) 
8.05  0.75  (10.79) 
const. -90.42  15.76  (-5.74)  
dummy (Mar 
2011) 
7.42  0.68  (10.90) 
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Jan-Feb 2011 
 
dummy (Apr 
2011) 
6.04 1.19 5.09 
Obs.: 2180, P-value: 0.0000, Pseudo 
R2: 0.0434 
 
 
dummy (May 
2011) 
2.68  0.70  (3.81) 
  _cons -25.83  3.81  (-6.78) 
     
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Mar-Jun 2011 
     
Obs.: 4360, P-value: 0.0000,  
Pseudo R2: 0.0493 
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Table III.6: Tobit analysis in post-earthquake period for Tohoku 
Earthquake pre-donation=0 and pre-donation=1 respectively 
Post-earthquake donation  Post-earthquake donation 
restricting pre-donation=0  restricting pre-donation=1 
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat.  
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat. 
gender 0.88  0.88  (1.00)  gender 2.77  1.98  (1.40) 
age<20 (omitted)  age<20 (omitted) 
20age<30 -4.32  1.83  (-2.37)  20age<30 -2.94  4.50  (-0.65) 
30age<40 -4.29  0.98  (-4.38)  30age<40 -2.13  1.90  (-1.13) 
40age<50 -2.16  0.84  (-2.58)  40age<50 3.51  2.03  (1.73) 
50age<60 -1.86  0.77  (-2.43)  50age<60 -0.02  1.42  (-0.01) 
log(income) 2.64  0.58  (4.57)  log(income) 3.35  1.21  (2.78) 
log(saving) 0.50  0.10  (5.20)  log(saving) -0.05  0.16  (-0.33) 
log(loan) -0.05  0.09  (-0.56)  log(loan) -0.03  0.17  (0.16) 
# of 
household 
members 
-0.98  0.28  (-3.49)  
# of 
household 
members 
-1.33  0.65  (-2.03) 
workrate -1.78  0.90  (-1.98)  workrate -1.40  1.95  (-0.72) 
log(distance) -0.76  0.34  (-2.28)  log(distance) 0.61  0.74  (0.82) 
dummy (Mar 
2011) 
8.01  0.78  (10.24)  
dummy (Mar 
2011) 
4.81  1.30  (3.71) 
dummy (Apr 
2011) 
6.01  0.78  (7.66)  
dummy (Apr 
2011) 
4.39  1.30  (3.38) 
dummy 
(May 2011) 
2.73  0.81  (3.38)  
dummy 
(May 2011) 
2.70  1.31  (2.07) 
_cons -25.41  4.26  (-5.97)  _cons -25.95  10.00  (-2.60) 
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Mar-Jun 2011 
Obs.: 4068, P-value: 0.0000, 
Pseudo R2: 0.0366 
 
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Mar-Jun 2011 
Obs.: 292, P-value: 0.0002, Pseudo 
R2: 0.0343 
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Table III.7: Tobit analysis in pre-earthquake period and post-earthquake 
period for Hanshin Earthquake 
Pre-earthquake donation  Post-earthquake donation 
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat.  
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat. 
gender -0.57  1.88  (-0.30)  gender 0.76  1.03  (0.74) 
age<20 (omitted)  age<20 (omitted) 
20age<30 -2.57  1.99  (-1.29)  20age<30 -2.78  1.19  (-2.34) 
30age<40 -3.18  1.20  (-2.65)  30age<40 -0.66  0.67  (-0.98) 
40age<50 -1.56  1.14  (-1.37)  40age<50 -0.36  0.66  (-0.55) 
50age<60 -2.37  1.19  (-1.99)  50age<60 -0.62  0.67  (-0.92) 
log(income) 2.67  0.84  (3.17)  log(income) 1.75  0.44  (3.94) 
# of 
household 
members 
-0.19  0.39  (-0.49)  
# of 
household 
members 
-0.49  0.22  (-2.21) 
workrate -4.18  1.53  (-2.72)  workrate -2.93  0.86  (-3.42) 
log(distance) 0.22  0.45  (0.49)  log(distance) -1.13  0.25  (-4.49) 
dummy (Dec 
1994) 
-0.27  0.73  (-0.37)  
dummy 
(pre-donation) 
4.55  0.48  (9.49) 
const. -26.24  6.44  (-4.07)  
dummy (Jan 
1995) 
11.20  0.67  (16.65) 
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Nov-Dec 1994 
 
dummy (Feb 
1995) 
8 0.65 12.3 
Obs.: 2218, P-value: 0.0038, Pseudo 
R2: 0.0086 
 
dummy (Mar 
1995) 
-1.42  0.78  (-1.83) 
     _cons -16.83  3.43  (-4.90) 
     
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Jan-Apr 1995 
Obs.: 4436, P-value: 0.0000, Pseudo 
R2: 0.0811 
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Table III.8: Tobit analysis in post-earthquake period for Hanshin 
Earthquake pre-donation=0 and pre-donation=1 respectively 
Post-earthquake donation  Post-earthquake donation 
restricting pre-donation=0  restricting pre-donation=1 
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat.  
Tobit 
regression 
coef. 
std. 
err. 
t stat. 
gender 0.85  1.26  (0.68)  gender -0.06  1.95  (-0.03) 
age<20 (omitted)  age<20 (omitted) 
20age<30 -3.30  1.48  (-2.22)  20age<30 -2.52  2.09  (-1.20) 
30age<40 -0.89  0.85  (-1.05)  30age<40 -0.77  1.15  (-0.67) 
40age<50 -0.39  0.85  (-0.45)  40age<50 -1.03  1.10  (-0.94) 
50age<60 -0.72  0.86  (-0.84)  50age<60 -0.61  1.10  (-0.55) 
log(income) 1.90  0.57  (3.35)  log(income) 1.70  0.72  (2.37) 
# of 
household 
members 
-0.79  0.28  (-2.87)  
# of 
household 
members 
0.40  0.41  (0.97) 
workrate -2.42  1.06  (-2.27)  workrate -4.87  1.49  (-3.27) 
log(distance) -1.17  0.31  (-3.73)  log(distance) -0.98  0.43  (-2.25) 
dummy (Jan 
1995) 
11.64  0.88  (13.18)  
dummy (Jan 
1995) 
10.51  0.99  (10.62) 
dummy (Feb 
1995) 
8.63  0.87  (9.88)  
dummy (Feb 
1995) 
6.72  0.98  (6.84) 
dummy (Mar 
1995) 
-1.98  1.05  (-1.89)  
dummy (Mar 
1995) 
-0.45  1.08  (-0.41) 
_cons -18.11  4.35  (-4.16)  _cons -12.12  5.66  (-2.14) 
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Jan-Apr 1995 
Obs.: 3480, P-value: 0.0000, Pseudo 
R2: 0.0715 
 
Dependent variable: log(donation) in 
Jan-Apr 1995 
Obs.:956, P-value: 0.0000, Pseudo 
R2: 0.0802 
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